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Labor Law & Employment Discrimination
LABOR LAW - No STRIKE CLAUSE - WHEN "ANY" STRIKE DOES NOT
INCLUDE A SYMPATHY STRIKE: BROADLY WORDED No-STRIKE CLAUSE
IS INSUFFICIENT TO ACT AS A WAIVER OF UNION'S RIGHT TO
SYMPATHY STRIKE.

Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters
Local 326 (1980).
In November 1975, General Teamster Local 326 (Union) was certified as the collective bargaining representative of the drivers and production and maintenance employees at the Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling
Company's (Employer) 1 Wilmington, Delaware plant.2 In the spring
of 1976, the Employer and the Union signed a collective-bargaining
agreement covering the production and maintenance employees.3
Subsequently, negotiations over a contract for the drivers stalled
and the drivers established a picket line at the Employer's plant. 4
Production and maintenance employees refused to cross the picket line 5
I. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local 326, 474 F. Supp.

777, 779 (D. Del. 1979), rev'd, 624 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1980). Coca-Cola, a
Delaware corporation wholly owned by the Coca-Cola Bottling Company of
Miami, processes and bottles soft drink ingredients for distribution and sale in
Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. 474 F. Supp. at 779.
2. 474 F. Supp. at 780. Following certification of the Union, contract
negotiations were begun. Id.
3. Id. The agreement was to be effective from June 1, 1976 to May 31,
1979. Id.
4. Id. After ratification of the production and maintenance employees'
agreement, negotiations for the drivers at the Wilmington plant continued for
approximately one month. Id. These negotiations ceased when the Employer
decided to contract with Countrywide Personnel (Countrywide) to supply
drivers, and a transfer of Coca-Cola's drivers to Countrywide ensued. Id. The
Union acquiesced in the transfer and negotiations commenced for a collective
bargaining agreement with Countrywide. Id. However, on March 22, 1977,
the Employer terminated its agreement with Countrywide and the drivers returned to their former positions with Coca-Cola. Id. After a one-day strike,
the Union and Coca-Cola began negotiating an agreement for the drivers. Id.
At their second meeting, Union President Frank Sheeran threatened the Employer with another strike if an agreement could not be reached quickly. Id.
Approximately three months later, on July 19, 1977, the Union called a strike
and established a picket line which the production and maintenance employees honored for a period of nine days until they were ordered back to

-work by the Union. Id.

5. Id. A refusal by employees to cross another union's picket line is
known as a sympathy strike. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428
U.S. 397, 404-05 (1976). For a discussion of the policy reasons behind the
protection afforded to sympathy strikers, see note 11 and accompanying text
infra.
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and a nine-day work stoppage ensued. 6 Alleging that the production
and maintenance work stoppage violated the express no-strike provision
of article 16 of the collective bargaining agreement,7 the Employer filed
suit in federal district court for monetary damages under section 301
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).8 The district court
awarded damages to the Employer, ruling that the Union had waived
its right to sympathy strike in the process of collective bargaining. 9
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 10
reversed, holding that a broad, generally worded no-strike clause, in
and of itself, does not constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of
the right to conduct a sympathy strike. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Teamsters Local 326, 624 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1980).
6. 474 F. Supp. at 780. The Union did not challenge the district court's
finding that the sympathy strike was an authorized union activity. 624 F.2d
at 1184.
7. 624 F.2d at 1184. Article 16 of the collective bargaining agreement
provides in pertinent part:
Section 1: The Union will not cause nor will any member of the
bargaining unit take part in any strike, sit-down, stay-in, slow down
in any operation of the Company or any curtailment of work or
restriction of service or interference with the operation of the Company or any picketing or patrolling during the term of this
Agreement.
Section 3: The provisions of this Article, other than as mentioned
above, shall not be subject to grievance or arbitration, for the purpose of assessing damages or securing specific performance, or any
other matter, such matters of law being determinable and enforceable in the courts.
Id. at 1183-84. The language of § I is not a picket line clause. Id. at 1185 n.l.
A picket line clause is one which specifies the employee's rights and obligations
when confronted with a picket line other than his own and is distinguishable
from a clause like article 16 which governs the right of the Union to maintain
its own picket line. Id.
8. 474 F. Supp. at 777. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). Section 301(a)
provides in pertinent part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id. The Employer also sought punitive damages, but this relief was deemed
to be unavailable under § 301. 474 F. Supp. at 788, citing Local 127, United
Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1967).
9. 474 F. Supp. at 782. The district court held that the broad language of
the no-strike provision, together with existing case law, which was construed
to uphold the efficacy of express strike prohibitions, supported the Employer's
contention that the Union had waived its right to sympathy strike through
collective bargaining. Id. at 782-83. The district court awarded the Employer $67,922.85 in damages. Id. at 784-88.
10. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz, Judge Rosenn and judge
Norma L. Shapiro of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Chief Judge Seitz wrote the majority
opinion. Judge Rosenn filed a concurring opinion.
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The right of employees to engage in sympathy strikes has long been
protected under section 7 of the NLRA. 11 This statutory right may,
however, be waived in a collective-bargaining agreement provided that
the waiver is clearly and unmistakably established. 12 The extent of
any waiver in a collective bargaining agreement rests upon the inter3
pretation of the contract as measured by the intent of the parties.'
The search for the parties' intent involves essentially a factual determination which requires that collective bargaining agreements be read
"as a whole and in light of the law relating to it when made." 14 Moreover, courts have construed language strictly and have been reluctant
to liberally apply waivers to matters subject to collective bargaining.' 5
Consequently, courts have taken the position that express language
will not be given an expansive reading.16
In the absence of an express no-strike provision, courts have resolved the conflict between the right to strike and the presence of a
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).

Section 7 provides in pertinent part:

"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... ." Id. Section 7
has been construed to include the right to wage sympathy strikes. See, e.g.,
W-I Canteen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 738, 743 (7th Cir. 1979); Local
12419, Int'l Union of Dist. 50, UMW (National Grinding Wheel), 176 N.L.R.B.
628 (1969).
The policy behind the protection afforded sympathy strikers by the NLRA
was articulated in NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 426 F.2d 1299,
1301 (5th Cir. 1970). The Greyhound court stated:
Initially, we think it obvious that when an employee, as a matter of
principle, refuses to cross a picket line at his own employer's place
of business, the employee, even though he is not a member of the
striking union, has in effect plighted his troth with the strikers, joined
in their common cause, and has thus become a striker himself . ..
Such an employee is therefore entitled to all the protections due
under the National Labor Relations Act to those strikers with whom
he has joined cause.
Id. (citations omitted).
12. See, e.g., W-I Canteen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 738, 743 (1979)
(waiver of right to sympathy strike found through the presence of express
no-strike and picket line clauses); NLRB v. C.K. Smith Se Co., 569 F.2d
162, 167 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 957 (1978); Gary Hobart Water
Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975);
Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 525 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
850 (1972); News Union v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
13. See, e.g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 279 (1956). For
a discussion of Mastro Plastics, see notes 36-40 and accompanying text infra.
14. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 279 (1956).
15. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir.
1976) (waiver of certain grievance procedures); Gary Hobart Water Corp. v.
NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975) (waiver
of the right to sympathy strike); NLRB v. Wisconsin Aluminum Foundry Co.,
440 F.2d 393, 399 (7th Cir. 1971) (waiver of a union's right to negotiate salary
bonuses).
16. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir. 1976).
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contractual waiver by implying a no-strike obligation on the part of the
union over issues which are subject to arbitration.lr This position is
commonly known as the common law doctrine of "coterminous interpretation" 18 and was first enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.19
In Lincoln Mills, a union entered into a collective bargaining
agreement which provided that there would be no strikes and that disputes over terms or conditions contained therein were subject to arbitration. 20 After the employer refused to arbitrate a dispute, the union
brought suit in federal district court requesting enforcement of the
employer's agreement to arbitrate. 21 On appeal, the Supreme Court
held in favor of the union, concluding that "[p]lainly the agreement to
arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not
to strike." 22
The quid pro quo concept was reaffirmed and refined in Gateway
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers.23 In Gateway, the Court accepted
17. See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 380-84 (1974). Accord,
Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-06
(1962); United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 548 F.2d 67, 73 (3d Cir. 1976).
See also Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61
CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1973).
Commentators are in accord that by agreeing to
arbitration, management has evidenced an intent to settle labor disputes in a
peaceful manner. Id. at 757. Thus, it is only fair that, before an activity as
potent and destructive as a strike is employed, the union exhaust the existing
administrative procedures. Id.
18. For a discussion of the application of the quid pro quo theory to
coterminous interpretation, see notes 19-28 and accompanying text infra. For a
discussion of coterminous interpretation generally, see Gateway Coal Co. v.
UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 380-84 (1974).
19. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
20. Id. at 449.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 455.
23. 414 U.S. 368 (1974). In Gateway Coal, the employer filed suit in
federal court under § 301 of the NLRA, requesting that the court enjoin the
union's continuing strike and require the union to comply with an arbitration
process established under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
at 372. The strike occurred over the reinstatement of employees who had been
previously suspended for creating a safety hazard by falsifying records to show
no reduction in airflow at a mine when, in fact, the airflow had been substantially impeded due to the collapse of a ventilation structure. Id. at 370-72.
The district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the union to
end the strike and submit the issue to arbitration. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW,
No. 71-567 (W.D. Pa. June 18, 1972) (order issuing preliminary injunction).
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed holding that the usual federal policy
favoring arbitration of labor disputes was not applicable to issues concerning
employee safety. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157, 1159-60 (3d Cir.
1972), rev'd, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). The court of appeals found no duty to
submit the issue to arbitration and, therefore, no implied duty to refrain
from striking. 466 F.2d at 1159. The Supreme Court ruled that the union
had a duty to arbitrate the dispute, requiring the union to arbitrate the
grievance and cease its striking activity, and reversed the court of appeals. 414
U.S. at 368-69. The court premised its ruling that the union had a duty to
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the employer's contention that the union, which struck over reinstatement of certain suspended employees,24 violated its agreement since the
issue underlying the strike was covered by the arbitration clause 25 and,
consequently, the union had an implied obligation not to strike.2 6 The
Court ruled that, absent an explicit intent to the contrary, "the agreement to arbitrate and the duty not to strike should be construed as having coterminous application." 27 Where coterminous interpretation
indicates an implied waiver of the right to strike, however, the union
has not waived its right to sympathy strike, since the underlying cause
of the strike is not between the sympathy strikers and their employer
28
and is, therefore, not arbitrable.
While Lincoln Mills and Gateway were concerned with agreements
which were silent on the strike issue,- 9 courts hav6 also considered the
effect of an arbitration clause on the scope of an express no-strike
provision.30 In NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co.,3' the Supreme
Court was confronted with the question of whether an employer could
discharge an employee who, contrary to the broad, express no-strike
clause contained in the collective bargaining agreement, 32 refused to
cross a picket line which was maintained by a sister union and aimed at
an employer other than his own. 33

The Court, relying on the plain

language of the clause and the bargaining history of the parties, reversed the decision of the National Labor Relations Board (Board)
arbitrate on the basis that doubts over arbitrability "should be resolved in
favor of coverage." Id. at 376-78, citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior &:
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). For a discussion of the
federal court's ability to issue injunctions in labor disputes, see Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); note 45 infra.
24. 414 U.S. at 371-72.
25. Id. at 379-80.
26. Id. at 380-84.
27. Id. at 382.
28. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 407-08
(1976). The Buffalo Forge Court remarked:
The strike at issue was a sympathy strike in support of sister unions
negotiating with the employer; neither its causes nor the issue underlying it was subject to the settlement procedures provided by the contracts between the employer and respondents. The strike had neither
the purpose nor the effect of denying or evading an obligation to arbitrate or of depriving the employer of its bargain.
Id. For a discussion of Buffalo Forge, see notes 41-45 and accompanying text
infra.
29. See notes 19-27 and accompanying text supra.
30. See notes 31-57 and accompanying text infra.
31. 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
32. Id. at 79. The collective bargaining agreement of the parties' "provided against strikes, lockouts, other cessation of work or interference therewith
except as against a party failing to comply with a decision, award, or order of
Id. at 74.
the Adjustment Board .......
33. Id. at 72-73.
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and ruled that the no-strike clause was sufficiently inclusive to restrict
84

a sympathy strike.
Subsequent cases, however, have sometimes departed from the view

taken in Rockaway.35 In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,36 a union
charged an employer with unfair labor practices for discharging employees who had struck over the alleged unlawful and discriminatory
firing of one of its members for his union activities.8 7 The employer's
34. Id. at 79-80. The Board, seeking reinstatement of its original order
against the employer, contended that the collective bargaining agreement was
of no legal effect because of a deficiency in the contract. Id. at 76. The
Board maintained that, due to its partial illegality, the contract was null and
void altogether and requested that the Court give no effect to the no-strike
clause and imply any terms necessary to govern parties' contractual relationship. Id. The Court refused the Board's request, preferring instead to sever
the excesses of the contract and let the dispute be controlled by the remaining
terms which had been collectively bargained for. Id. at 79. Thus, the Court
gave full effect to the express no-strike clause and went on to cite three reasons
why the clause was sufficiently inclusive to restrict a sympathy strike. Id. at
79-80. First, the Court noted that the plain meaning of the no-strike clause
prohibited any strike, sympathy or otherwise. Id. at 79. Second, the bargaining history of the parties revealed that the union had suggested a work
stoppage clause which would have read: "No man shall be required to cross
a picket line." Id. at 79-80. This demand was ultimately rejected by the
employer and acquiesced to by the union. Id. Finally, the Court stated
that the contract made no mention of the union's right to sympathy strike
even though many other collective bargaining agreements in the industry did
contain such a provision. Id.
35. See, e.g., International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 v.
Davis-McKee, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 652 (1978). The National Labor Relations
Board has indicated that it rejects Rockaway as support for the position that
a waiver of the right to sympathy strike may be inferred from general no-strike
language. Id. at 653. The Board has limited Rockaway to its facts, reading
the Rockaway opinion as implicitly relying on the bargaining history of the
parties to infer a waiver. Id., citing Keller-Crescent Co., a Div. of Mosler,
217 N.L.R.B. 685, 691 (1975), enforcement denied, 538 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir.
1976).
In his concurring opinion in Davis-McKee, however, Member Penello
objected to the majority's reading of Rockaway. 238 N.L.R.B. at 656-57
(Penello, M., concurring). He argued that, in Rockaway, while the bargaining history of the parties may have been offered as proof of an intentional
relinquishment of the right to sympathy strike, it is not clear that the offer
was ever accepted as evidence. Id. at 656 (Penello, M., concurring), citing
NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. at 80. Additionally, Member
Penello noted that the Rockaway Court could not have affirmed the judgment
of the court of appeals as they did in reliance upon a bare offer of proof, for
only "where the record is complete and balanced in its presentation, can an
appellate court reverse without remanding." 238 N.L.R.B. at 656 n.26 (Penello,
M., concurring), citing 10 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 103.23 (2d ed. 1979).
The fact that the court of appeals reversed without remanding and the Supreme Court simply affirmed suggested to Member Penello that neither court
relied solely on the bargaining history and that Rockaway's impact has not
been diminished. 238 N.L.R.B. at 656 (Penello, M., concurring).
36. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
37. Id. at 276. In January 1951, the union initiated proceedings before
the Board charging the employer with the commission of unfair labor prac-
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affirmative defense was that the express no-strike provision in the collective bargaining agreement amounted to a waiver of the right to strike
over any employee grievance, economic or otherwise. 8 The Supreme
Court disagreed and, without citing Rockaway, held that the broad nostrike provision failed to constitute an agreement by the union not to
strike over unfair labor practices, 9 and emphasized that finding a
waiver would dilute the protection afforded by the NLRA regarding the
employees' right to organize and act as an economic unit.40 Similarly,
in Bufialo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,41 the Supreme Court refused to enjoin a sympathy strike pending an arbitrator's decision as to
whether the strike violated the express strike prohibition contained in
the collective bargaining agreement. 42 The basis of the Court's decision
4
acts as a limitation
was that section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia ActO
tices for unlawful discharge of its members for their strike activity. Id. The
Board ordered the employer to cease and desist from these unlawful practices
and reinstate the discharged employees. Mastro Plastic Corp., 103 N.L.R.B.
511 (1953). The court of appeals accepted the Board's findings and enforced
the order. NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 214 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd,
350 U.S. 270 (1956).
38. 350 U.S. at 277.
39. Id. at 281-84. The Court held, over the strong protest of Justice
Frankfurter, that the Board and the Second Circuit were correct in their
interpretation that the language "any strike" did not preclude strikes protesting unfair labor practices. Id. at 281. The Court concluded that when read
as a whole, the contract dealt only with the economic relationship between
the parties and restricted the meaning of the no-strike clause to strikes over
economic matters. Id. at 281-84.
40. Id. at 281-84. The Court's own language revealed its concern over
the unique nature of unfair labor practices. See id. at 283. The Court
stated that to effectuate the ban on strikes "would eliminate, for the whole
year, the employees' right to strike, even if petitioners, by coercion, ousted the
employees' lawful bargaining representative and, by threats of discharge, caused
the employees to sign membership cards in a new union." Id. Indeed, the
Court went on to imply that the right to strike over unfair labor practices
may be unwaivable. Id. In any event, the Court stated that general language
banning all strikes was insufficient to prohibit strikes against unfair labor
practices which are "unlawful practices destructive of the foundation upon
which collective bargaining must rest." Id. at 281.
41. 428 U.S. 397 (1976), aff'g 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975).
42. 428 U.S. at 404. The collective bargaining agreement provided that
"[t]here shall be no strikes, work stoppages or interruption or impeding of
work." Id. at 399 n.l. The Court noted, however, that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act acted as a limitation on its equitable powers, and while it had carved out
narrow exceptions to that Act in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
398 U.S. 235 (1970), Buffalo Forge did not fall within the exception and hence
the application for injunctive relief was denied. 428 U.S. at 413. For a discussion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, see note 43 infra. For a discussion of
the relevance of Boys Market, see note 15 infra.
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).

Section 4 provides in pertinent part:

No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any per-
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upon the Court's power to enjoin a strike over an issue which is, like
45
a sympathy strike,44 not subject to arbitration.
The courts of appeals have adopted varied postures with regard to
the applicability of the doctrine of coterminous interpretation to contracts containing express no-strike provisions. 40 The Seventh Circuit,
in W-I Canteen Services, Inc. v. NLRB 7 held that while general lanson or persons participating or interested in such dispute . . . from
doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation

of employment.
Id. The policy behind the Act was to "foster the growth and viability of labor
unions." Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970).
Prior to its enactment, strikes and other forms of concerted union activity
were usually enjoined, unless the union could justify its means by showing a
direct and immediate self-interest. See, e.g., Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492,
57 N.E. 1011 (1900). The requisite self-interest was typically found where
union activity was directed at higher wages or better working conditions, but
objectives such as the closed shop or unity of organization were not deemed
to constitute a sufficient justification. Id. at 497, 57 N.E. at 1013. Consequently, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act which divested federal
courts of their injunctive powers in such cases and ensured that activities
such as picketing, strikes, and boycotts would be protected regardless of their
objective. See Note, Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers: The End to
the Erosion of the Norris-LaGuardiaAct, 55 N.C. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (1977).
Thus, the purpose behind the Act was to improve working conditions through
the free play of economic forces. Id. The complexity of labor disputes and
the need for judicial sensitivity was reflected in the sentiments of Senator
Norris when he stated: "It is because we have now on the bench some judges and undoubtedly we will have others - who lack the judicial poise necessary in passing upon the disputes between labor and capital that [an antiinjunction law] is necessary." 75 CONG. REC. 4510 (1932) (remarks of Sen.
Norris). Apparently such an opinion was well founded. Between 1900 and
1927, 118 applications were submitted for federal labor injunctions: 70 were
issued ex parte, only 12 of which were supported by affidavits and, during the
same period, only 9 injunctions were denied. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE,
THE LABOR INJUNCTION 64 n.8 (1930).
44. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
45. 428 U.S. at 404-08. The availability of the federal courts to issue
injunctions to enjoin a strike over an issue which is clearly arbitrable represents a judicial exception to the general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
In Boys Markets, the Supreme Court accommodated § 301 of the NLRA by
issuing an injunction to enjoin a strike where the issue underlying the strike
was clearly arbitrable. Id. at 250-55. For the text of § 301, see note 8 supra.
The basis for the Court's decision to issue the injunction consisted of the
policy of enforcement behind § 301 and the congressional preference for voluntary and private settlement mechanisms which flow from the NLRA. Id. at
250-55. In Buffalo Forge, however, the issue underlying the dispute, a sympathy strike between sister unions and a common employer, was clearly not
arbitrable and, hence, did not conform to the narrow exception of Boys Markets. 428 U.S. at 407-08.
46. See notes 47-57 and accompanying text infra.

47. 606 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1979). The petitioner sought review of a Board
order declaring that petitioner's discharge of employees for engaging in sympathy strikes was an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA. W-I
Canteen Serv., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 609 (1978), enforcement denied, 606 F.2d
738 (7th Cir. 1979). The court of appeals declined to enforce the order, finding
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guage of a no-strike clause was insufficient, in and of itself, to waive
the union's right to wage sympathy strikes, 48 an express picket line
clause 49 read in conjunction with the no-strike clause would amount to
such a waiver.50 The court stated that the principle of coterminous
interpretation did not apply to express no-strike clauses and that the
arbitration and no-strike clauses remained analytically distinct. 5'
The District of Columbia Circuit has held that broad, express
52
no-strike language can embrace a restriction against sympathy striking.
In News Union v. NLRB, 53 the court expressly rejected the union's
contention that language which proscribes any strike should not be read
54
as waiving the right to engage in sympathy strikes.
On the other hand, the First Circuit, in NLRB v. C.K. Smith &
Co., 55 held that language which prohibits "any strike" is not tantamount
that the collective bargaining agreement proscribed strikes of any kind at the
employer's premises. 606 F.2d at 749.
48. Id. at 745.
49. The controlling picket line clause authorized the union to observe
existing picket lines at premises other than the employer's. Id. at 745-46.
For a discussion of the relationship between a picket line clause and a nostrike clause, see note 7 supra.
50. 606 F.2d at 745-46. The W-1 Canteen court noted the broad language
of the no-strike clause and the insertion of two picket line clauses, and concluded that, when read as a whole, the agreement indicated that the union had
waived its right to engage in a sympathy strike at the employer's premises. Id.
51. Id. at 744. The court in W-I Canteen ruled that coterminous interpretation is merely a rule of contract interpretation and does not preclude the
parties from expressing an intent to effectuate the no-strike and arbitration
clauses differently. Id. In fact, the court found that the language prohibiting
work stoppages was indicative of an express intention to extend the no-strike
obligation beyond the arbitration clause. Id. Additionally, the court rejected
a suggestion by the union that it could not forego its right to sympathy strike
without specific reference to sympathy strikes in the no-strike clause of the
agreement. Id. at 745.
52. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text infra.
53. 393 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The union petitioned the court to set
aside a Board order which had dismissed its complaint against the employer
for discharging employees who honored a sympathy strike at the employer's
plant. Hearst Corp., Baltimore News Am. Div., 161 N.L.R.B. 1405 (1966).
The court of appeals affirmed the order, finding that the union's observance
of the picket line was in violation of its collective bargaining agreement. 393
F.2d at 677-78. The relevant portion of that agreement read as follows: "The
Union and its members individually and collectively will not, during the term
of this Agreement, cause, permit, or take part in any strike, sit down, picketing
or other curtailment .... " Id. at 676-77 n.4.
54. 393 F.2d at 676-78. The union had urged the court to read the language which prohibited "any strike" as not including the right to engage in
sympathy strikes. Id. The court, however, responded that "the practical
relationship between work stoppages and the honoring of picket lines is so
well understood in the industrial climate that we think that a clause of this
kind using only the word "strike" includes plant suspensions resulting from
refusals to report for work across picket lines." Id.
55. 569 F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 957 (1978). The
court of appeals enforced an order of the Board requiring the employer to
cease and desist from committing unfair labor practices and to reinstate em-
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to a clear and unmistakable waiver 56 and that, absent an explicit
intention to the contrary, the non-strike and arbitration clauses should
be read coterminously so as not to preclude the union's right to engage
7
in sympathy strikes.5
Against this background, the Third Circuit considered the scope of
the express no-strike provision and arbitration clause contained in CocaCola's collective bargaining agreement.5 8 The court began with the
proposition that the right to engage in sympathy strikes may be waived
in a collective bargaining agreement provided that the waiver was clearly
and unmistakably established. 59 Consequently, the court noted at the
outset that the express no-strike language would not be subject to a
60
liberal interpretation.
Noting the absence of any specific reference to sympathy strikes
within the agreement,6 ' the court examined the meaning of the prohibition against "any strike." 62 The court looked to precedent and
found two sources to support the argument that broad general language
was insufficient to act as a waiver of the right to engage in a sympathy
strike.63 First, the Third Circuit found support in Buffalo Forge for
the extension of the doctrine of coterminous interpretation 64 to express
no-strike provisions.65 The court read Buffalo Forge, which declined
to enjoin a sympathy strike pending an arbitrator's decision over the
legality of the work stoppage,6 6 as excluding from the coverage of the
67
no-strike clause any matter which was not subject to arbitration.
ployees who were discharged for engaging in a sympathy strike at the employer's
premises. 569 F.2d at 168-69. See C.K. Smith 8c Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 1617 (1977).
56. 569 F.2d at 168-69. The court relied heavily on its reading of Mastro
Plastics to limit the scope of the no-strike clause to stoppages over economic
issues, which are matters within the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at
167. While recognizing that Mastro Plastics was distinguishable in that it
involved a strike over an unfair labor practice, the court felt that the right
to engage in sympathy strikes, protected by § 7 of the NLRA, was equally
deserving of judicial protection. Id.
57. Id. at 168-69.
58. 624 F.2d at 1184-85.
59. Id. at 1184, citing United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 550, 555
(3d Cir. 1976).
60. 624 F.2d at 1184.
61. Id. at 1184-85.
62. Id. at 1185.
63. Id.
64. For a discussion of coterminous interpretation, see notes 17-28 and
accompanying text supra.
65. 624 F.2d at 1186. The majority noted that "[t]he relevance of Buffalo
Forge is the recognition that, absent some evidence to the contrary, the quid
pro quo theory underlying coterminous interpretation applies where there is
an express no-strike clause in the contract." Id. For a discussion of Buffalo
Forge, see notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
66. 428 U.S. at 404-08. See notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
67. 624 F.2d at 1186,

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss3/9

10

Editors: Labor Law & (and) Employment Discrimination
1980-81]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

Second, the majority read Mastro Plastics as support for the position
that agreements employing prohibitions against "any strike" fall short
of establishing a clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to sympathy
strike.68 Noting that in Mastro Plastics, as in the instant case, the contract dealt only with the economic relations of the parties 69 and that
in Buffalo Forge, the Supreme Court limited the application of the nostrike clause to matters covered by the contract, 70 the Third Circuit concluded that nothing short of explicit language could constitute a waiver
7
of the right to sympathy strike. '
The court then examined the extrinsic evidence and found that it
too was lacking in sufficient clarity to reveal a waiver. 72 After noting
73
that no evidence of bargaining history was presented in the trial court,
the majority focused its analysis on the structure of the contract 74 and
the state of the relevant law at the time the contract was made, 75 and
68. Id. at 1187. For a discussion of Mastro Plastics, see notes 36-40 and
accompanying text supra.

69.
281-83.
70.
U.S. at
71.
167.

624 F.2d at 1187, citing Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. at
624 F.2d at 1187, citing Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428
407-08.
624 F.2d at 1187. Accord, NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d at

72. 624 F.2d at 1188-89. See notes 73-76 and accompanying text infra.
For a general discussion of the role of extrinsic evidence in the interpretation
of collective-bargaining agreements, see notes 13-14 and accompanying text

supra.

73. 624 F.2d at 1188-89.
74. The majority rejected the district court's finding that the no-strike and
arbitration clause were "functionally independent." Id. at 1188. The district
,court had employed this term as a means of portraying the independence between the two clauses and rejecting the quid pro quo theory in regard to
express no-strike provisions. See 474 F. Supp. at 782-83. The Third Circuit
maintained that the phrase "functionally independent" was imprecise, ambigu,ous, and without precedent. 624 F.2d at 1188. The court's primary criticism
of the phrase was that physical separation or lack of cross-reference between
the arbitration and no-strike clauses did not amount to a waiver since the
normal assumption is that the quid pro quo theory applies - a proposition
which was substantiated to the court's satisfaction by its reading of Buffalo

Forge. Id.
75. The court of appeals also rejected the trial court's finding that case
law existing at the time the contract was executed had only utilized the quid
pro quo theory where the no-strike and arbitration clauses were tied together.
Id. at 1188-89. The district court had found that existing case law distinguished broad independent no-strike clauses from more limited dependent
clauses. 474 F. Supp. at 782-83, citing NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co.,
345 U.S. 71 (1953). For a discussion of Rockaway, see notes 31-35 and accom.
panying text supra. The Third Circuit, however, maintained that it found
no distinction in case law between dependent and independent clauses and
concluded that, under existing case law, there was not evidence of a clear and
unmistakeable waiver of the right to sympathy strike. 624 F.2d at 1189. To
buttress its position, the court noted that it read Buffalo Forge as authority
for the quid pro quo theory, even though in that case the Supreme Court had
been faced with two seemingly independent clauses. Id. at 1188 n.4, citing
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. at 399 n.l. Moreover, the
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found that neither was sufficient to act as a waiver of the right to
70
sympathy strike.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rosenn disagreed with the majority's application of the coterminous interpretation doctrine to the
express no-strike provisions. 7 7 He found no support in Buffalo Forge
for the majority's position,78 finding instead, that as an action for injunctive relief, as opposed to damages, 79 Buffalo Forge was predicated
on the availability of equitable relief under the provisions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act 80-an issue which had no bearing on the instant case. 8'
Thus, Judge Rosenn would have distinguished Buffalo Forge and would
limit its precedential value to cases involving requests for injunctive
relief.8 2 Similarly, he distinguished Mastro Plastics on the basis that
it involved a strike over an unfair labor practice 8 3-a right deserving
Third Circuit noted that the "mere fact that dependent clauses preclude a
waiver does not necessarily mean that independent clauses will result in a
waiver." 624 F.2d at 1189.
76. 624 F.2d at 1188-91. See notes 74 8c 75 supra.
77. 624 F.2d at 1191-94 (Rosenn, J., concurring). Judge Rosenn would limit
the doctrine of coterminous interpretation to implied no-strike obligations. Id.
at 1194 (Rosenn, J., concurring). While Judge Rosenn took exception to the
majority's analysis of coterminous interpretation, he concurred in the result,
finding that since the Union had honored a strike over an alleged unfair labor
practice by a common employer, the Union's rights were derived from those
of the primary strikers and, under Mastro Plastics, the right to strike over
unfair labor practices must be waived explicitly, if it can be waived at all.
Id. at 1195-97 (Rosenn, J., concurring). For a discussion of Mastro Plastics,
see notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra. In essence, Judge Rosenn
equated the rights of the sympathy strikers with those of the primary strikers
where the activity of the latter is aimed at an alleged unfair labor practice
committed by a common employer. 624 F.2d at 1195-97 (Rosenn, J., concurring). This is a conclusion which the majority expressly declined to
embrace. See id at 1187 n.3.
78. 624 F.2d at 1192 (Rosenn, J., concurring). For a discussion of the
majority's interpretation of Buffalo Forge, see notes 65-67 and accompanying
text supra.
79. It should be emphasized that Coca-Cola was not seeking injunctive
relief - indeed the strike had long ended - but rather was seeking monetary
damages from the union. See notes 5-9 and accompanying text supra.
80. See notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
81. 624 F.2d at 1192-93 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 1193 (Rosenn, J., concurring). In fact, the concurring opinion
suggested that Buffalo Forge might be inapposite to the majority's position,

since it expressly reserved to the arbitrator the determination of whether the

strike violated the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1194 (Rosenn, J.,
concurring), citing Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. at 410.
This reservation suggested to Judge Rosenn that, contrary to the position of
the majority, the Supreme Court took no position on the impact of coterminous
interpretation on express no-strike provisions. See 624 F.2d at 1194 (Rosenn,
J., concurring). For a discussion of the majority's statement on the relevance
of Buffalo Forge to express no-strike provisions, see notes 65-67 and accompanying text supra.

83. 624 F.2d at 1195-96 (Rosenn, J., concurring).

For a discussion of

Mastro Plastics, see notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the majority's use of Mastro Plastics as authority for the position that
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of special protection in order to prevent an employer from insulating
his unlawful conduct from concerted union activity.8 4 In the view of
Judge Rosenn, the argument that general language cannot waive the
right to sympathy strike would be limited to strikes over unfair labor
85
practices.
Upon reviewing the Third Circuit's opinion, it is submitted that
the court has made a broad extension of the doctrine of coterminous
interpretation without case law support. The essence of the court's
holding is that broad, general language is insufficient to constitute a
waiver of the right to engage in a sympathy strike.8 6 To overcome
that presumption, a showing must be made, through the use of extrinsic
evidence,8 7 that the parties intended to agree to a no-strike clause
which is broader than the arbitration clause from which it emanated.88
The Third Circuit relied on Mastro Plastics for its holding that
express language prohibiting "any strike" is insufficient to act as a
waiver of the right to sympathy strike.8 9 Mastro Plastics, however, held
merely that a broad no-strike clause must yield to the right of a union
to protest unfair labor practices.90 Admittedly, the Mastro Plastics
Court found the language at issue there to fall short of a waiver, 91 but
it did so out of a unique concern that an employer could frustrate
collective bargaining by insulating his violations of the NLRA from
reprisal by the concerted activities of his employees.9 2 It is submitted
that the policy considerations surrounding sympathy strikes are simply
not as compelling as the concerns in the unfair labor practice situation.98
broad general language of an express no-strike clause is insufficient to constitute a waiver of the right to sympathy strike, see notes 68-71 and accompanying text supra.
84. See 624 F.2d at 1195 (Rosenn, J., concurring). See also notes 39-40

and accompanying text supra.
85. 624 F.2d at 1195-96 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
86. See 624 F.2d at 1187-88. For a discussion of the court's holding, see
notes 64-71 and accompanying text supra.
87. For a discussion of the court's use of extrinsic evidence, see notes 72-76
and accompanying text supra.
88. 624 F.2d at 1190-91.
89. For a discussion of the Coca Cola court's reading of Mastro Plastics,
see 624 F.2d at 1187. See also notes 36-40 & 68-71 and accompanying text

supra.
90. See 350 U.S. at 281-84.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 283. See also notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
93. For a discussion of the policy of the NLRA in affording protection to
sympathy strikers, see note 11 supra. For a discussion of why courts will not
apply a literal interpretation to a broad no-strike clause to preclude a strike
over an unfair labor practice, see note 40 and accompanying text supra. It
is submitted that the underlying concern of the Third Circuit in the instant
case is that, without benefit of the right to sympathy strike, the Union is left
without a remedy since, by definition, the dispute resulting in a sympathy strike
is not between the sympathy strikers and their employer and, consequently,
is not subject to arbitration or other forms of administrative redress. See note
28 and accompanying text supra.
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It is further submitted that while a literal interpretation of the no-strike
clause with regard to unfair labor practices will undermine the policies
of the NLRA,94 such an interpretation in regard to sympathy strikes
will enhance the process of collective bargaining by assuring the employer that the terms of the clause will be given vitality and meaning.
It is suggested that any concern for affording the employer the benefits of his bargain is conspicuously absent from the court's analysis, as
is any consistent application of the case law which is both inapposite
to the court's result and supportive of the employer's right to enforce a
5
broad no-strike clause as a measure of what the parties bargained for.0
While coterminous interpretation has beome a fixture in cases
recognizing no-strike obligations by implication, 96 it is submitted that
its application to express no-strike provisions is without support in
case law. While cases such as Lincoln Mills 97 and Local 174, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,98 have suggested
that a no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quid pro quo for
the presence of an arbitration clause, 99 the language used by the Court
may have been unduly broad, because, as the issue in those cases was
whether the Court could imply the no-strike obligation, the language
relating to express provisions was merely dictum.1 00
94. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
95. See, e.g., NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953);
W-I Canteen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1979); News Union

v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

The Third Circuit does pay cursory

attention to two of these cases which were offered by the employer as support
for effectuating a broad no-strike clause. See 624 F.2d at 1185 n.1, 1188.
The court utilizes Rockaway as an illustration of the impact of bargaining
history on contract interpretation. See id. at 1188. At least impliedly, therefore, the court has asserted that the no-strike provision in Rockaway was
given deference because it was consistent with a showing of the bargaining
history of the parties. See id. This reading of Rockaway has not been universally accepted and has been the subject of much debate both within the
courts and the Board. See note 35 and accompanying text supra. The importance of Rockaway cannot be overstated since it represents the only Supreme Court opinion on point. Similarly, the majority distinguished W-I
Canteen on the basis of two picket line clauses which had been relied upon
by the Seventh Circuit in reaching its conclusion that the union had waived
its sympathy strike rights. 624 F.2d at 1185 n.l. The Third Circuit noted
that in the instant case the absence of a picket line clause was not determinative, since such a clause could have been used to either relinquish or
support the Union's right to observe existing picket lines. Id.
96. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Local 174
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). For a discussion of these
cases, see notes 19-27 and accompanying text supra.
97. For a discussion of Lincoln Mills, see notes 19-22 and accompanying
text supra.
98. 369 U.S. 95 (1962). For a discussion of Lucas Flour,see note 17 supra.
99. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
100. 624 F.2d at 1191-92 (Rosenn, J., concurring); International Union
of Operating Engineers, Local 18 v. Davis-McKee, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 652,
658-59 (1978) (Penello, M., concurring).
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In addition, it is submitted that the court's reliance on Buffalo
Forge as authority for its extension of the doctrine of coterminous interpretation is misplaced. As Judge Rosenn 101 and others have noted, 10 2
the thrust of Buffalo Forge was its analysis of the effect of the NorrisLaGuardia Act on the Court's injunctive powers 103-an analysis inapplicable in the instant case since that Act governs only the court's
equitable powers. 04 Indeed, the Buffalo Forge Court never reached
the issue of whether damages were available 105 or whether the sympathy
strike was legal.' 06 Thus, it is submitted that the case can hardly
stand, as the majority suggests, for an express sanction of the use of the
doctrine of coterminous interpretation to control broad general language
prohibiting strikes. 0 7 Instead, it is submitted that, as Judge Rosenn
suggests, the opinion should be limited to the context of the relief requested, specifically, an injunction. 108
Indeed, it is submitted that application of the Third Circuit's version of Mastro Plastics and Buffalo Forge may produce incongruous
results. As already noted, in the absence of any no-strike provision it
101. See 624 F.2d at 1192-94 (Rosenn, J., concurring). For a discussion
of Judge Rosenn's interpretation of Buffalo Forge, see notes 78-82 and accompanying text supra.
102. See International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 v. DavisMcKee, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 652, 659-60 (1978) (Penello, M., concurring).

103. See 428 U.S. at 410-12.

For a discussion of the holding of Buffalo

Forge, see notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
104. See note 43 supra.

105. See 428 U.S. at 399.
106. Id. at 410. The Buffalo Forge opinion suggested more than once
that it neither decided whether the sympathy strike was legal nor necessarily
endorsed the Third Circuit's extension of the doctrine of coterminous interpretation. Id. First, the Court was careful to note that the legality of the
strike was not at issue and was within the purview of the arbitrator. Id.
This fact has led at least one commentator to state boldly that:

Although prearbitration injunctive relief against the sympathy strike
was not ordered, the majority ruled that the dispute over the scope
of the no-strike clause was arbitrable. Thus the Court left the arbitrator free to construe the no-strike clause as prohibiting sympathy
strikes, even though the dispute that caused the sympathy work
stoppage was not arbitrable . . ..
[T]his suggests that, unless the
agreement specifically so provides, an otherwise unrestricted express
no-strike clause should not be construed as coextensive with the
scope of the grievance-arbitration provisions when the disputed issue
concerns the permissibility of a sympathy work stoppage.
Smith, The Supreme Court, Boys Markets, Labor Injunctions, and Sympathy
Work Stoppages, 44 U. CH. L. REv. 321, 356-57 (1977). But see International
Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 v. Davis-McKee, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B.
652, 654 n.10 (1978) (the function of the courts are limited, and it would

not be proper for the Court to comment on the impropriety of the strike
where the issue is left to the arbitrator).
107. See 624 F.2d at 1186. See also notes 64-71 and accompanying text
supra.
108. See 624 F.2d at 1193 (Rosenn, J., concurring).

See also note 82 and

accompanying text supra.
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is well-settled that the union waives its right to strike over arbitrable
issues. 109 Under the court's holding, however, the insertion of an
express no-strike provision achieves precisely the same result.110
Thus, it is submitted that the court has effectively stripped the express
no-strike clause from the contract, making it devoid of any meaning,
and depriving the employer of his bargain. The presence of a superfluous clause is hardly a result which was likely to be intended by
experienced negotiators,"' and certainly a construction contrary to the
2
basic tenets of contract interpretation."1
In addition, it is submitted that, from a policy standpoint, it is un-

sound to endorse the construction of the majority which places a greater
emphasis on securing a union's right to strike over disputes to which it
is not a party than over its own grievances. Assuming that an employee's

own economic conditions of employment are of paramount concern," 83
it is submitted that courts should carefully avoid any decision which,
through implication of contractual terms, elevates an employee's right
109. See notes 17-27 and accompanying text supra.
110. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
111. The court would allow its presumption of coterminous interpretation to be overcome upon a showing of extrinsic evidence that the parties

intended otherwise. See 624 F.2d at 1188. As already mentioned, a pri.
mary consideration in that determination is whether the relevant case law,
existing at the time the contract was made, is indicative of the parties' intent.
Id. at 1184. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. By 1976, when the
contract was executed, coterminous interpretation was firmly established in the
areas of implied no-strike obligations. See note 96 and accompanying text
supra. It thus seems logical to deduce that by inserting an express no-strike
clause, the parties intended to conceive of a no-strike clause broader than the
arbitration clause. Such a conclusion is not only logical in that it renders
the provision meaningful, but is supported by empirical evidence as well.
See Feller, supra note 17, at 757-60. A recent study of data taken from the
Department of Labor shows that nearly half of the no-strike provisions analyzed
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics were absolute bans, causing one author to
comment that "the no-strike provisions of most collective agreements constitute a quo considerably in excess of the quid of the agreement to arbitrate."
Id. These results clearly contradict the court's opinion that "in the normal
case the union will not agree to a no-strike clause that extends beyond the
arbitration clause." 624 F.2d at 1186.
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or CONTRACTS §229(a) (1975). Section
229(a) provides in pertinent part: "An interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, lawful, or of no effect." Id. (emphasis
added). In the comment to § 229(a), it is observed that:
Since an agreement is interpreted as a whole, it is assumed in the
first instance that no part of it is superfluous. . . . But, particularly,
in cases of integrated agreements, terms are rarely agreed to without
reason. Where an integrated agreement has been negotiated with care
and in detail and has been expertly drafted for the particular transaction, an interpretation is very strongly negated if it would render
some provisions superfluous.
Id. comment.
113. See Local 12419, Int'l Union of Dist. 50 UMW (National Grinding

Wheel), 176 N.L.R.B. 628, 630 (1969).
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to obesrve another Union's picket line above and beyond the right to
strike over its primary disputes. This was exactly the point that the
Board made when it reasoned that "an employee who ceases work in
deference to another's picket line, though he enjoys the same protection as if he engages in a strike of his own, enjoys no higher protection

either."

114

In conclusion, it is submitted that the Third Circuit's wholesale
application of the doctrine of coterminous interpretation to agreements
containing express no-strike provisions is inconsistent with prior use of
the doctrine as a rule of contract interpretation."15 It is further submitted that its extension of coterminous interpretation is without case
law support 116 or sound policy reasoning,"? and effectively operates to
deprive the employer of his bargain."18 The result will surely be greater
specificity and clarity in collective bargaining agreements-and there lies

the real, if only, virtue of the Third Circuit's decision.
Jeffrey A. Lutsky
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
See
See
See
See

notes
notes
notes
notes

17-27 & 95 and accompanying text supra.
96-108 and accompanying text supra.
109-14 and accompanying text supra.
109-12 and accompanying text supra.
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LABOR LAW - FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA)

STATUS OF HIGH-

-

SALARIED MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES WHO LOSE THEIR EXEMPTION
FROM THE OVERTIME PROVISIONS OF THE

FLSA Is

NOT TO BE

MEASURED BY THE WORKWEEK STANDARD.

Marshall v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1980)
The plaintiff, the Secretary of Labor (Secretary), initiated an action
in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey1
seeking to compel the defendant employer, Western Union Telegraph
Co. (Western Union), to make overtime payments to managerial employees who performed rank and file work during a prolonged strike. 2
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or Act), 3 managerial employees are normally exempt from the requirement that an employer pay
an overtime premium. 4 The Secretary, however, contended that this
exempt status could be lost through the performance of non-exempt work
I. Marshall v. Western Union Tel. Co., 621 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir. 1980). The
Secretary of Labor initiated this action to enforce the provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA or Act) pursuant to § 11 of the Act, which provides
that the Secretary may bring all actions to restrain violations of its provisions.
See 29 U.S.C. §211 (1976).
Section 17 of the FLSA provides that the United States District Courts
shall have jurisdiction to entertain suits brought to restrain violations of the
Act. See id. § 217 (describing injunction proceedings).
2. Brennan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 561 F.2d 477, 478 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) (prior opinion), For a discussion of Bren.
nan, see notes 6-8 & 42-51 and accompanying text infra. On June 1, 1971,
Western Union's employees, represented by the United Telegraph Workers and
the Communications Workers of America, went out on strike. 561 F.2d at
478. The membership of the United Telegraph Workers returned to work on
July 7, 1971 but the Communications Workers remained on strike through
September 12, 1971. Id. In order to maintain certain necessary communications services - such as those essential to national defense - Western Union
assigned approximately 2,100 managerial employees to perform the work normally done by the striking union members. Id. The parties stipulated that
some of the managerial employees devoted more than 50% of their time during
the strike to clerical, technical, maintenance, and operational tasks normally
performed by the striking rank and file employees. Id. at 479.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976) (originally enacted as the Fair Labor Standards Act of June 25, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060).
4. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-219 (1976). Section 6 of the FLSA contains minimum wage provisions. Id. § 206. Section 7 prescribes maximum permissible
hours and also contains the requirement that an employer pay time-and-onehalf overtime. Id. § 207. Section 13 (a)(1) contains an exemption from §§ 6
and 7 for employees who meet the standard for classification as managerial
employees. Id. § 213(a)(1). For the text and a discussion of § 7, see note 14
and accompanying text infra.

(812)
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during a strike.5 In Brennan v. Western Union Telegraph Co.PG the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had held that administrative, executive and professional employees who perform the functions
of non-exempt employees during a strike could lose their exempt status, 7
but remanded the case to the district court for a determination of the
standard by which an employee's exempt status as a managerial employee was to be measured.8 On remand, the district court accepted the
Secretary's interpretation that the "workweek" standard was the yardstick by which to determine managerial exemptions. 9 Western Union
appealed from the application of this standard as it related to highsalaried managerial employees whose exempt status is defined by the
so-called short test of the Code of Federal Regulations.' 0 On appeal,
the Third Circuit" reversed, holding that the Secretary's proffered
workweek standard could not be applied to high-salaried managerial
employees since the acceptance of any particular time frame to measure
the loss of a managerial employee's exemption from the overtime requirement of the FLSA would involve the court in administrative rulemaking.
Marshall v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 621 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir. 1980).
5. Brennan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 561 F.2d 477, 480-81 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978).
6. 561 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978). Marshall
represents the appeal of the district court's order in response to the Third
Circuit's holding in Brennan.
7. 561 F.2d at 484. The district court held that the loss of exempt status
applied to administrative and professional employees only, and that executives
were to be treated differently under the "emergencies" provision of the regulations. Dunlop v. Western Union Tel. Co., 78 Lab. Cas. 33,340 (D.N.J. Jan.
28, 1976) (For the emergencies provision, see 29 C.F.R. § 541.109 (1979). The
Brennan court, however, did not reach this issue because Western Union disclaimed reliance on the "emergencies" provision. 561 F.2d at 484. Therefore,
the appellate court affirmed the holding of the district court as to the administrative and professional employees and reversed as to the executives. Id. The
court then continued to treat all three classes as "managerial employees." Id.
For a further discussion of Brennan, see notes 42-51 and accompanying text
infra.
8. 561 F.2d at 483. The court noted that important questions involving
the application of the regulations were still left open: "For example, the district court has not yet specifically decided if, under the regulations, the determination of whether an employee is 'employed in a bona fide executive . . .
capacity' is to be made with respect to each workweek separately or with
respect to a broader period of time." Id., quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1) (1976)
(omission by the court).
9. Marshall v. Western Union Tel. Co., No. 79-1695, slip op. at 18 (D.N.J.
Jan. 29, 1979), rev'd, 621 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the
workweek standard, see notes 57-61 and accompanying text infra.
10. Marshall v. Western Union Tel. Co., 621 F.2d at 1249. See 29 C.F.R.
541.1(f) (1979) (executives); id. §541.2(e) (administrators); id. §541.3(a) (proessionals). For a discussion of these regulations, see notes 30-38 and accompanying text infra.
11. The case was heard by Judges Garth, Gibbons, and Rosenn. judge
Rosenn wrote the opinion of the court. It should be noted that Chief 'Judge
Seitz and Judges Aldisert and Hunter decided Brennan. Chief Judge Seitz
wrote the opinion in that case and Judge Hunter concurred in a separate
opinion. See 561 F.2d at 477.
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The FLSA was enacted in 1939 as a remedial act with the avowed
purpose of alleviating conditions which were detrimental to the maintenance of a minimum standard of living necessary for the health,
efficiency, and well-being of workers engaged in the production of goods
for interstate commerce. 12 To achieve this end, Congress included in
the FLSA provisions which place a floor under wages 13 and a ceiling
on hours. 14 Congress also required that overtime payments be made to
employees who work more than forty hours in any workweek. 15 Specifically exempted from the Act's overtime requirement are those managerial employees who are employed in a "bona fide executive, administrative or professional capacity." 16 The terms executive, administrative
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).

In order to achieve these goals, the FLSA

represents "a comprehensive legislative scheme for preventing the shipment in

interstate commerce of certain products and commodities produced in the
United States under labor conditions as respects wages and hours which fail to
conform to standards set up by the Act."
100, 109 (1941).

United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.

In urging Congress to accept the FLSA, President Roosevelt said:
The overwhelming majority of our population earns its daily
bread either in agriculture or in industry. One-third of our population, the overwhelming majority of which is in agriculture or industry,
is ill-nourished, ill-clad, and ill-housed. . . . Our Nation, so richly
endowed with a capable and industrious population, should be able
to devise ways and means of insuring to all our able-bodied working
men and women a fair day's pay for a fair day's work. A selfsupporting and self-respecting democracy can plead no justification for
the existence of child labor, no economic reason for chiseling workers'
hours.... As we move resolutely to extend frontiers of social progress,
we must be guided by practical reason and not barren formula. We

must ever bear in mind that our objective is to improve and not impair the standard of living of those who are now undernourished,
poorly clad, and ill-housed.

81 CONG. REc. 4983-84 (1937).
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976) (minimum wage).
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1976). Section 7 provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall
employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless
such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of
the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half
times the regular rate at which he is employed.

id.
See generally Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 460 (1947)

(FLSA to compensate for wear and tear of workweek in excess of 40 hours);
Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44, 45 & n.2 (1943) (FLSA to
limit hours); Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577-78
(1942) (limitation on hours to distribute employment opportunities); White v.
Witwer Grocer Co., 132 F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir. 1942) (intention of FLSA
is to set a floor under wages and a ceiling over hours).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1976). For the text of § 7, see note 14 supra.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1976). Section 13 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The provisions of sections 6 . . .and 7 of this title shall not
apply with respect to -
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and professional employee are defined and delimited by the Secretary
7
through the promulgation of regulations.'
The promulgation of regulations by the Secretary must be in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).1s However, the APA explicitly excludes from its notice and
comment provisions interpretive rules or statements of agency policy.' 9
When the interpretation of an administrative regulation is at issue, the
courts look to the administrative agency's construction.2 0 It has been
stated that the "ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation,
which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation." 21
The courts may, however, find that an agency's purported interpretive regulation is in fact legislative,22 and therefore subject to the
notice and comment requirements of the APA.23 Failure to adhere to
the APA provisions renders an improperly enacted legislative regulation
(1) Any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity . . . (as such terms are defined and

delimited from time to time by regulations of the Secretary, subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. ..
Id. § 213(a) (1).
17, See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1976). The definitions provided by the
Secretary are published in the Federal Register, are subsequently compiled

in the Code of Federal Regulations, and are to be judicially noticed.
44 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1507, 1510 (1976).

See

18. 5 U.S.C. § 551-559 (1976). The APA requires that the agency give notice
of a proposed rulemaking unless the rules are "interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; or . . .
when the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure

thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. Id.
§§ 553(b)(3)(A)-(B). After notice has been given, the agency must allow interested persons to participate in the rulemaking through the submission of written
commentary. Id. § 553(C).
19. Id. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1976). For a discussion of the meaning of "interpretive rules," see note 29 infra.
20. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock 8 Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945).
In Bowles, the Court stated that where agency interpretation of a regulation is
involved "a court must necessarily look at the administrative construction of the
regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt." Id.
21. Id. at 414. In the Bowles case, the Supreme Court addressed the issue

of the weight to be given an administrative interpretation of a regulation. Id.
at 413-14. The controlling weight to be accorded administrative interpretive
rulings was further clarified when the Supreme Court contrasted the standards
of deference to administrative interpretations of statutes and interpretations of
regulations. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (deference clearly

in order where administrative regulation was in issue).
22. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 & n.9 (1977). In Batterton,
the Court noted that where Congress has entrusted an agency with the responsibility of defining a statutory term, the definitional regulations are adopted with
legislative effect. Id. at 425. Regulations adopted through a legislative power,
if enacted in compliance with the rulemaking procedures of the APA, can be
overturned by the courts only if the regulation is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."

5 U.S.C. §§ 706

(2)(A), (C) (1976).
23. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) (provisions applicable to all rulemaking; exceptions limited).

For a discussion of § 553, see note 18 supra.
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invalid.2 4 The determination of whether an agency's interpretive rule
is in fact legislative has been made in several ways. 25 Some courts have
looked to the practical effect of the rule and, if the rule substantially
2
affects legal rights, the courts conclude that the rule is legislative.
Another approach is to accept the agency's characterization of the rule
as interpretive or legislative if the agency has been delegated the power
to legislate rules.27 If the rule is characterized as legislative, it must
have been enacted in compliance with the APA provisions; 28 if the rule
is characterized as interpretive, the court is free to substitute its own
interpretation, but only if construction propounded by the agency is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation which it
29
interprets.
24. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1976) (courts shall set aside agency action
found to be without observance of procedure required by law). Noting that
the purpose of the APA notice and comment provisions is to assure fairness and
mature consideration of rules of general application, the Supreme Court has

refused to let stand improperly promulgated rules.
Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764, 766 (1968).

See NLRB v. Wyman-

25. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text infra.
26. This method has been termed the "substantial impact" test. See
Asimow, Public Participationin the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy
Statements, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 521, 523 (1977); Koch, Public Procedures for the
Promulgation of Interpretive Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64 GEo.
L.J. 1047, 1061 (1976).
The substantial impact test has been followed in most circuits. See Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 627 F.2d 984, 986-87 (9th Cir. 1980); Brown
Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 701-07 (5th Cir. 1979); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663, 669 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995
(1978); Detroit Edison Co. v. EPA, 496 F.2d 244, 248-49 (6th Cir. 1974); LewisMota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 481-82 (2d Cir. 1972). The substantial
impact test, however, is not without its critics. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE § 7:15, at 69-76 (2d ed. 1979).
27. This test has been called the "legal effect" test. See Asimow, supra
note 26, at 523. The legal effect test thus addresses two issues: 1) the degree of
binding force that a regulation has on the courts; and 2) the procedure required
for proper issuance of the rule. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 26, § 7.15, at 76.
The legal effect test was adopted by the Third Circuit for determining the
legality of an agency's interpretive ruling. See Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall,
620 F.2d 964, 981-82 & nn.45-47 (3d Cir. 1980), noted in The Third Circuit
Review, 26 VILL. L. REV. 861 (1981); Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged
v._Matthews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1255 n.9, 1258-59 (3d Cir. 1978).
28. For a discussion of the requirements of compliance with the notice and
comment provisions of the APA when an agency exercises a congressionally
delegated legislative function, see notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
29. Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 981-82 & nn.45-47 (3d Cir.
1980). In Cerro, the court noted that the major distinction between legislative
and interpretive rulings is not the nature of the questions they address but the
authority and intent with which the rules are issued. Id. at 981. It is submitted, therefore, that any rule which is not enacted pursuant to the APA provisions must be intended as an interpretive ruling. The courts are bound by an
agency's interpretive ruling to the extent that the interpretation is of controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation it interprets. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945);
notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss3/9

22

Editors: Labor Law & (and) Employment Discrimination
.1980-81]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

The interpretive regulations promulgated under the authority of
the FLSA provide a long test and a short test for determining whether an
employee is employed in a managerial capacity3 0 and is thus normally
exempt from the FLSA's overtime pay provisions. 81 The guidelines
presented by these tests are formed by combining the requirement that
the employee perform certain duties with specific minimum weekly
82
salary levels.
The long test provisions provide for the lower salary level of the
two tests 8 but the job description is quite detailed. 34 Furthermore, to
qualify as a managerial employee under the long test an employee may
devote no less than eighty percent of his working hours during the work30. The Code of Federal Regulations contains different regulations for
executives, administrators and professionals. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (1980) (executives); id. § 541.2 (administrators); id. § 541.3 (professionals). The regulations
are substantially the same. See id. Discussion of all three classes will be
grouped under the category of managerial employees. For the text of the
regulation defining "bona fide executive," see note 32 infra.
31. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1-541.3 (1980). In all three regulations, the proviso
of the final paragraph contains the short test provision, which is a substitute for
the long test contained in the rest of the regulation. See id. For the text of the
regulation defining executive status, see note 32 infra.
32. The provision containing the test for executive status provides:
The term "employed in a bona fide executive . . . capacity" in
section 13(a)(1) of the act shall mean any employee:
(a) Whose primary duty sonsists of the management of the enterprise in which he is employed or of a customarily recognized department of [sic] subdivision thereof; and
(b) Who customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more
other employees therein; and
(c) Who has the authority to hire or fire other employees [or whose
recommendation, as to hiring, firing or promoting will be given particular weight]; and
(d) Who customarily and regularly exercises discretionary powers;
and
(e) Who does not devote more than 20 percent . . . of his hours
of work in the work-week to activities which are not directly and closely
related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (a)
through (d) of this section . . . ; and
(f) Who is compensated for his services on a salary basis at a rate
of not less than $155 per week . . . ; Provided, that an employee who
is compensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $250 per
week . . . and whose primary duty consists of the management of the
enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof, and includes the customary
and regular direction of the work of two or more employees therein
shall be deemed to meet all the requirements of this section.
29 C.F.R. § 541.1(a)-(f) (1980).
33. Compare id. § 541.1 (f) (long test salary level of $155) with id. § 541.1(f)
(proviso) (short test salary level of $250 per week).
34. See id. § 541.1(a)-(d) (1980). For the text of the regulation, see note
32 supra.
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week to the managerial duties specified within the other long test
provisions.35
The short test applies to high-salaried employees, 86 and the corre7
sponding duties are much more broadly defined than in the long test.
To qualify as a managerial employee under the short test, an employee's
"primary duty" must be management and he must customarily and
regularly direct the work of other employees.38
When determining whether an employee is covered by the protective provisions of the FLSA, the exemptions are narrowly construed
35. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (e) (1980).

For the text of the regulation, see note

52 supra.
36. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(f) (1980) (proviso). The salary level of "highsalaried" executives is $250 per week. Id. The short test salary figure is the
See id.
same for executive, administrative, and professional employees.
§§ 541.1(f), 541.2(e) (2), 541.3(e).
37. Compare id. § 541.1(a)-(d) with id. § 541.1(f) (1980) (proviso). For the
text of the regulation, see note 32 supra. For a discussion of the meaning of
the duties of a high-salaried managerial employee, see note 38 and accompanying text infra.
38. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(0 (1980) (proviso). The regulations provide a
definition of the term "primary duty." Id. § 541.103. Section 541.103 provides
in pertinent part:
A determination of whether an employee has management as his
primary duty must be based on all the facts of a particular case.
The amount of time spent in the performance of the managerial duties
is a useful guide in determining whether management is the primary
duty of an employee. In the ordinary case it may be taken as a good
rule of thumb that primary duty means the major part, or over 50
percent, of the empoyee's time. Thus, an employee who spends over
50 percent of his time in management would have management as his
primary duty. Time alone, however, is not the sole test, and in situations where the employee does not spend over 50 percent of his time
in managerial duties, he might nevertheless have management as his
primary duty if the other pertinent factors support such a conclusion. Some of these pertinent factors are the relative importance of
the managerial duties as compared with other types of duties, the frequency with which the employee exercises discretionary powers, his
relative freedom from supervision, and the relationship between his
salary and the wages paid other employees for the kind of non-exempt
work performed by the supervisor.
Id.
Judicial application of the regulation defining primary duty has not limited its meaning to a specific time period. See, e.g., Wainscoat v. Reynolds
Elec. & Engr. Co., 471 F.2d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 1973);, Topel v. Northern Va.
33,274 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd mem., 77 Lab. Cas.
Sun, Inc., 77 Lab. Cas.
33,275 (4th Cir. 1975). In Wainscoat, the court denied the workers' overtime claim and noted that "the major portion of their time was spent in
exempt functions." 471 F.2d at 1162. In applying the short test criteria, the
court made no mention of a workweek standard, despite the fact that appellant's claims were for "work in excess of forty hours per week during various
monthly periods." Id. at 1158.
Similarly, overtime compensation was denied a plaintiff, although he may
have spent more than 50% of his time in non-managerial duties, because his
"primary duty during his employment consisted of . . . management .
Topel v. Northern Va. Sun, Inc., 77 Lab. Cas. 33,274, at 47,071.
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against the employer seeking to assert them. 39 In this context, many
courts have refused to find that employees are managerial where their
title or job description merely allows their employers to demand burdensome workweeks without compensating the employees in accordance with
the overtime requirements of the FLSA.40
Against this background, the Third Circuit in Marshall was presented with the question of whether, under the standard of judicial
review for interpretive administrative rulings, the workweek was the
proper time frame for determining whether high-salaried managerial
employees would lose their exemption from the FLSA's overtime
41
provisions.
As a preface to a discussion of the specific issue before it, the court
reviewed its holding in Brennan,42 in which the Secretary had argued
that the policy of compensating workers for a burdensome workweek
applied with respect to each distinct workweek. 4 The Brennan court
had acceded to this view, finding that such a conclusion was within the
Secretary's discretion. 44 Furthermore, the Brennan court had stated
that the overtime requirement of the FLSA applies to "any" employee
who works over forty hours during a workweek.4 The court had placed
the burden on Western Union to show that this did not apply to managerial employees doing strike work.46 Finally, in considering the
39. See, e.g., Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (exemption from humanitarian legislation must be narrowly construed); Arnold v.
Ben Kanowski, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960) (exemptions narrowly construed
against employers seeking to assert them).
40. See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 332 (1955 & Supp. 1980). See also
Hodgson v. Cactus Craft, 481 F.2d 464, 466 (9th Cir. 1973) (title of supervisor
and ability to hire and fire employees not equivalent to executive status);
Mitchell v. Williams, 420 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1969) (employee who worked as
embalmer, ambulance driver, funeral director and general manager not exempt);
Wirtz v. Bledsoe, 365 F.2d 277, 279 (10th Cir. 1966) (employee who supervised

the work of other employees but also did physical work not exempt). But see
McReynolds v. Pocahontas Corp., 192 F.2d 301, 303 (4th Cir. 1951) (exempt
employee doing non-exempt work during a strike does not lose exempt status).
41. 621 F.2d at 1248.
42. Id. at 1248-49, citing Brennan v. Western Tel. Co., 561 F.2d 477 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978). See note 6 supra.
43. 561 F.2d at 481.
44. Id. at 480-81.

The Brennan court noted the references in the text of

§ 7 of the FLSA, which refers to "any" workweek. Id., citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(a)(1) (1976). For the text of this section, see note 14 supra. The
Brennan court also noted the general rule that an agency's interpretation of

its own governing statute is accorded deference. 561 F.2d at 482, citing
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-25 (1977). For a discussion of Batterton,
see note 22 supra. The Brennan court then cited the Supreme Court for the
proposition that one intended result of the FLSA was to compensate all

workers who worked a burdensome workweek.

561 F.2d at 482, citing Over-

night Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577-78 (1942).
45. 561 F.2d at 483. The court was apparently referring once again to
§ 7 of the FLSA. See note 44 supra. For the text of § 7, see note 14 supra.
46. 561 F.2d at 483. This burden fell on Western Union, apparently
through application of the general rule that exemptions from the FLSA are
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regulations defining managerial employees, 47 the Brennan court had
agreed with the Secretary that the exemptions did not "universally
exclude all managerial personnel who perform strike duty." 48 The
Brennan court had noted that an agency's explication of its regulation
is controlling if reasonable49 and held that managerial personnel who
perform strike duty are not necessarily exempt from the FLSA's overtime provisions.5 0 Judge Hunter added, in a concurring opinion, that
the district court should not be misled by the majority's apparent acceptance of the workweek standard and noted that the short test provisions might not be suited to application on a week-to-week basis. 51
On remand, the district court accepted the workweek as the standard
by which to determine whether a managerial employee performed primarily exempt managerial work or nonexempt rank and file work,5 2
since Western Union had failed to show that it was plainly erroneous
3
or inconsistent with the regulation.
On appeal by Western Union, the Marshall court applied two distinct approaches in considering whether the district court's adoption
of the workweek standard was appropriate.5 4 First, the court examined
narrowly construed against the employer asserting them.

See note 39 and

accompanying text supra.
47. For a discussion of the regulations, see notes 30-38 and accompanying
text supra.
48. 561 F.2d at 483.
49. Id., citing Lucas Coal Co. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals,
522 F.2d 581, 584 (3d Cir. 1975).
In Lucas, the court noted that the "interpretation of an administrative
regulation . . . may not be set aside unless such ruling is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulations." Id. at 584, citing Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 16 (1965). For a discussion of Udall v. Tallman, see note 21 and
accompanying text supra.
50. 561 F.2d at 483. The Brennan court remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of, inter alia, whether status as a managerial employee was to be determined with respect to each workweek separately or with
respect to a broader period of time. Id. The Brennan court had declined
to address questions of the detailed application of the regulations since these
were for the district court to determine on remand. Id. at 483 & n.10.
51. Id. at 484-45 & n.1 (Hunter, J., concurring).
52. Marshall v. Western Union Tel. Co., No. 79-1165, slip op. at 3-4
(D.N.J. Jan. 21, 1979). See also 621 F.2d at 1249 (summary of district court
holding).
53. Marshall v. Western Union Tel. Co., No. 79-1165, slip op. at 14
(D.N.J. Jan. 21, 1979). Noting that the question was a close one, Judge Lacey
determined that the application of the workweek standard could not be termed
"unreasonable or plainly erroneous." Id. slip op. at 18. Judge Lacey declined to follow the path suggested by Judge Hunter's concurrence in Brennan.
Id. Judge Hunter had suggested that the workweek standard might in fact
be inconsistent with the regulations and noted that the court need not accept
an inconsistent interpretation. See 561 F.2d at 484-85 & n.1 (Hunter, J.,
concurring).
54. 621 F.2d at 1249-54. Western Union appealed from this decision, contesting the propriety of the workweek standard as it applied to high salaried
managerial employees whose exempt status is determined by the short test
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the structure and substance of the applicable regulations.5 5 The court
noted that the question of how to define the primary duty of highsalaried managerial employees who deviate from their normal work
course was the heart of the issue before them.55 The Secretary argued
that the workweek standard, although not present in the short test
itself,57 was a reasonable standard since it is present throughout the

FLSA.5 s The Marshall court rejected this position because it determined
that the FLSA was designed to protect wage earners and low-salaried
employees, 59 and found no support in the Act for the conclusion that
high-salaried employees are similarly protected. 60 Furthermore, the
court summarily rejected the Secretary's contention that the repeated
appearance of the workweek standard throughout the Act indicated a
legislative intent that the same standard should apply to the short test.61
This argument was dismissed as being in direct conflict with the ac62
cepted canons of statutory interpretation.
provisions. Id. at 1249. For a discussion of the two tests, see notes 30-38
and accompanying text supra.
55. 621 F.2d at 1249-52.
56. Id. at 1250. For the text of the regulation, and a discussion of other
courts' determinations of primary duty, see note 38 and accompanying text
supra.

57. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(f) (1980) (proviso) (short test defining
executive). For the text of the regulation, see note 32 and accompanying
text supra.

58. 621 F.2d at 1250. The court conceded that the workweek is a fundamental part of the FLSA. Id. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 206 (minimum wage); id.
§ 207 (maximum hours); id. § 213 (exemptions).
59. 621 F.2d at 1250-51. The Marshall court determined that the FLSA
was manifestly designed to place a floor under wages and a ceiling on hours.
Id. at 1250. The effect of the wage and hour limits was to distribute employment opportunities and compensate for overtime. Id., citing White v.
Witwer Grocer Co., 132 F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir. 1942).
60. 621 F.2d at 1251. The court stated that: "[t]here is nothing in the
Act that demonstrates Congress had these concerns in mind for managerial
employees and that it, therefore, intended the workweek standard also be
applied to them in measuring their exempt status." Id. The court reasoned
that Congress realized that the working conditions of high-salaried managerial
employees would be significantly better than those of the hourly wage earner
and that Congress, therefore, was not concerned with the number of hours
worked per week by managerial employees, nor with their hourly wage. Id.
But see Brennan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 561 F.2d 477, 484 (executives
doing strike work indistinguishable from rank and file). See also note 44 and
accompanying text supra.
61. 621 F.2d at 1251.
62. Id. Under established canons of statutory interpretations, the inclusion of a specific term in one section of a statute coupled with its exclusion in
another section of the same statute establishes that such exclusion was intentional and the term should not, therefore, be implied. See, e.g., FTC v. Sun
Oil Co., 371 U.S..505, 515 (1963). The Sun Court stated: "There is no reason appearing on the face of the statute to assume that Congress intended to
invoke by omission in [one section of the statute] the same broad meaning . ..
which it explicitly provided by inclusion in [another section of the statute];
the reasonable inference is quite the contrary." Id. at 515.
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In further considering the regulations, the court considered the
definition of primary duty contained therein.68 This regulation was
felt to be aimed at a holistic approach to defining primary duty, 64 with
time being just one element to be considered.6 5 In conclusion, the
court noted that the regulations themselves in no way compel the
measurement of primary duty in any partciular time frame. G6
The second approach taken by the Marshall court was to examine
the practical effects that adoption of the workweek standard would
have. 67 It was within their province, the court noted, to interpret the
FLSA; 68 however, it would be beyond the scope of their power to add
new substantive provisions to the Act.69 The court felt there would be
widespread repercussions throughout the industry and commerce of the
nation should the workweek standard be accepted.7 ° The court stated
that the effect of accepting the workweek standard would be to accept
a substantive amendment to the regulations. 71 The court deemed this
to be a legislative function, 72 properly exercised only by the Secretary
in accordance with the informal rulemaking procedures of the APA.S
In view of its analysis, the Marshall court refused to accept the workweek standard, noting that the notice and comment provisions of the
63. 621 F.2d at 1252. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (1980). For the text of the
regulation defining primary duty, see note 38 supra.
64. 621 F.2d at 1252.
65. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (1980). For the text of the regulation, see
note 38 supra.
66. 621 F.2d at 1252.
67. Id. at 1252-54.
68. Id. at 1252-53, citing Rachal v. Allen, 376 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir.
1967) (interpretation of the FLSA is a function of the courts as well as the
Secretary); Walling v. LaBelle S.S. Co. 148 F.2d 198, 202 (6th Cir. 1945) (ultimate issue of coverage under the FLSA is a judicial question).
69. 621 F.2d at 1253, citing E.C. Schroeder Co. v. Clifton, 153 F.2d 385,
390 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 858 (1946). The Schroeder court stated:
The [FLSA] is to be accorded a liberal construction. But the
function of judicial interpretation of a statute is to bring out and
give effect to that which is already in it, latent or otherwise. It is
not to add new provisions, substantive or otherwise, which the legislative tribunal in the exercise of its permitted choice omitted or
withheld.
153 F.2d at 390.
70. 621 F.2d at 1254. Some of the wide ranging effects envisioned by the
court included increased recordkeeping, adjustments of workloads and payrolls, and weekly determinations of whether an employee was exempt or not
from FLSA coverage. Id.
71. Id. at 1253.
72. Id. The effect of the court's ruling at this point was to leave the
Secretary with recourse only to rulemaking procedures. For a discussion of
the necessity of adhering to the informal rulemaking procedures of the APA
when engaged in a legislative function, see notes 22-24 and accompanying text
supra.

73. 621 F.2d at 1253-54.
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APA will allow the Secretary to make an informed determination of
74
what standard is appropriate for the short test provisions.
In reviewing the Marshall court's holding, it is submitted that the
court achieved a desirable result, although the route by which the court
arrived at its decision failed to comply with the standard of judicial
review for administrative interpretation of agency regulations which has
been adopted by the Third Circuit.75 Under the approach explicitly
adopted in the Third Circuit, where an agency characterizes its ruling
as interpretive, the courts are bound to accept that characterization, and
the ruling may be overturned only if plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation it purports to interpret.76 Although the
Marshall court examined the regulations in issue,7 7 the court did not
determine that the workweek standard was plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the short tests for managerial status.78 At best, the
court concluded that the workweek standard was not compelled by the
use of the phrase primary duty. 79

However, it has been held that an

agency's interpretation of its regulations, if reasonable, is controlling
despite the existence of other interpretations which may seem more
reasonable.8 0

74. Id. at 1254. The court observed: "Section 553 was enacted to give
the public an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process. It also
enables the agency promulgating the rule to educate itself before establishing
rules and procedures which have a substantial impact on those regulated ......
Id., quoting Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969).
75. See Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 981-82 & nn.45-47
(3d Cir. 1980). In Cerro the court stated the approach adopted by the Third
Circuit: "The alternative approach .... is to take the agency at its word. If
an agency that has the statutorily delegated power to issue legislative rules
chooses instead to issue an interpretive rule, the court accepts that characteriza-

tion of the rule but is free to arrive at its own interpretation." Id. at 981,
citing Daughters of the Miriam Center for the Aged v. Matthews, 590 F.2d
1250, 1255 n.9, 1258-59 (3d Cir. 1978). For a discussion of the legal effect test
of administrative agency rulemaking which has been applied in the Third
Circuit, see notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
76. See note 75 supra.
77. See notes 55-66 and accompanying text supra.
78. See 621 F.2d at 1251. The court noted that "our interpretation is
consistent with the structure and substance of the regulations and effects a
result compatible with economic reality." Id. But see Lucas Coal Co. v.
Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 522 F.2d 581, 584 (3d Cir. 1975).
In Lucas, the court stated that "[an agency's explication of its regulation if
reasonable, therefore, is controlling despite the existence of other interpretations that may seem even more reasonable." Id., citing Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 16 (1965). For a discussion of Lucas and Udall, see notes 21 & 49 and
accompanying text supra.
79. See 621 F.2d at 1252; notes 56-62 and accompanying text supra.
80. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra. See also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,
413-14 (1945); Lucas Coal Co. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 522
F.2d 581, 584 (3d Cir. 1975).
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Had the Marshall court wished to adhere strictly to the legal effect
test, 8' it is submitted that Judge Hunter's concurrence in Brennan
provides the proper guidelines for such analysis.8 2 Judge Hunter had
noted that the broad language of the short test provisions is ill-suited to
definition on a week-to-week basis, and hence the Secretary's interpretation is inconsistent with the regulation and not entitled to controlling weight.83 The Marshall court hinted at this approach, but did
not enunciate a finding of inconsistency.8 4

Therefore, it is submitted

that the Marshall court did not meet the requirement for judicial invalidation of an agency's interpretation of its own regulations in
accordance with the method of judicial review as adopted in the Third

Circuit.8 5
Conversely, it is submitted that the standard of review actually
applied by the Marshall court is in accord with the approach taken by
86
By examining the widespread ramifications
the majority of courts.
87
the Marshall
which acceptance of the workweek standard would have,
88
Thus, alcourt was actually applying the substantial impact test.

though the

Secretary proffered

the workweek standard

as an inter-

81. For a discussion of the legal effect test, see notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
82. 561 F.2d at 484-85 (Hunter, J., concurring). See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
83. 561 F.2d at 484-85 (Hunter, J., concurring). Judge Hunter, therefore,
found a means of establishing that there was an inconsistency between the
interpretive rule and the regulation that it purported to interpret. Id.
84. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra. The Marshall court
did note that:
[T]his suit at the present time does not attempt to resolve a particular controversy based on the law as it presently exists, but rather
seeks to have this court enunciate a new rule which will then be
applied for the first time to Western Union. The Secretary has never
before proffered the workweek standard as a measure for primary duty
under the regulation.
621 F.2d at 1253. It is submitted that the fact that the workweek standard
had not been previously suggested as the measure of primary duty could be
grounds for a finding that the rule is inconsistent with the regulation it supposedly interprets.
85. For a discussion of judicial standards of review for agency interpretive rulings, see notes 25-29 & 82-83 and accompanying text supra.
86. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
87. For a discussion of the court's treatment of the practical consequences
of adopting the workweek standard, see note 70 and accompanying text supra.
88. For a discussion of the substantial impact test, see note 26 supra. In
describing the substantial impact test, the Third Circuit has said that the
purpose of this test is to "distinguish between interpretive and legislative
rules and then to strike down the latter if found to be masquerading as the
former." Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 981 (3d Cir. 1980).
Under this approach the courts look at what a rule "really" does. Id. If the
rule substantially affects a legal interest, it must be promulgated in accordance
with the notice and comment procedures of the APA. Id. For a discussion of
the APA rulemaking procedures, see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976); note 18 supra.
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pretation of the regulations,8 9 the fact that it would have a substantial
impact on those affected by the regulations led the court to determine
.that the ruling was in fact legislative.90 In this context, the informal
rulemaking procedures of the APA must be followed.91
It is submitted that the Marshall decision may have beneficial effect
in two respects. Primarily, the Marshall court has prevented the implementation of agency rules through judicial acceptance of an arguably
substantive amendment to the regulations. 92 This reflects a much warranted sensitivity for the business community as well as compliance
with the notice and comment provisions of the APA. 93 Also, the court
has reimplemented the substantial impact test, although not explicitly
94
and possibly not even intentionally.
The impact that the Marshall decision will have on the standard
of judicial review to be applied to interpretive administrative rulings
appears to be minimal.9 5 It is submitted that, since the court never
.explicitly addressed the issue of the proper test to be applied by the
.courts when faced with a purported interpretive ruling, future courts
will probably not look upon Marshall as a return to the substantial
impact test.96 Furthermore, since the Marshall court decided the issue
without any discussion of the proper test to be applied, it is quite
possible that the court never intended to rule on the question of which
test the courts ought to apply. Thus, it is submitted that, although
89. This is evidenced by the fact that the Secretary, who had the delegated power to enact legislative rules, proffered the workweek standard at trial
.as an interpretation of the regulations. See 621 F.2d at 1248, 1253.
90. See id. at 1253-54.
91. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
92. See notes 63-66 &c68-71 and accompanying text supra.
93. It is submitted that those persons who will be severely effected by
,changes in agency regulations are necessarily interested and are to be afforded the opportunity to provide responsive commentary to the administrative agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976). Given the obvious impact upon the
business community that the proposed change would have, input from this
-sector is essential for effective rulemaking. See 621 F.2d at 1253-54. Further.
more, the adoption of the workweek standard would effect all short test managerial employees, regardless of the context in which they perform nonexempt
-work. See id. at 1253. Thus, it is submitted that every employer with short
test managerial employees on the payroll would be effected, without opportunity to participate in the rule change which would result.
94. It is submitted that the court followed the substantial impact test by
looking to the practical effect of what the interpretation would actually do.
See notes 67-73 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the substantial impact test, see notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra. However,
the Marshall court offered no discussion as to the method to be employed
in reviewing the purported interpretive rules of an administrative agency,
although the issue of the correct method to be employed had been reiterated
,by the court less than two weeks earlier. See Cerro Metals Prods. v. Marshall,
620 F.2d 964, 981-92 c nn.46-47 (3d Cir. 1980), citing Daughters of Miriam
-Center for the Aged v. Matthews, 590 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1978).
95. See text accompanying notes 96-97 infra.
96. See notes 86-90 and accompanying text supra.
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the possibility for debate exists, the Marshall court's acceptance without
discussion of the substantial impact test will be looked upon not as a

7
rejection of the legal test, but as a harmless misapplication of that test1

It appears that the Secretary has no recourse available, other than
the initiation of informal rulemaking proceedings, should he desire to
make the workweek standard applicable to short test managerial employees. 98 However, it is submitted that this is unlikely to occur in
light of the difficulty that the Secretary has encountered in attempting
to utilize rulemaking procedures to modify other portions of the Regulations.99 The resistance of the business community to attempt to make
far less drastic revisions of the Regulations indicates that an amendment
to the Regulations to compel overtime payments to high-salaried managerial employees who do rank and file work during a given workweek
is not a realistic alternative at this time.100 It is submitted, therefore,
that in reality the Marshall court has done little more than maintain the
pre-Brennan status quo between high-salaried managerial employees and
their employers, while giving each constituency an opportunity to par-

ticipate in the proceedings which may alter their relationship.' 01
Douglas J. Smillie
97. It is submitted that, when compared with the detailed consideration,
presented in earlier cases, of which standard ought to be applied when courts
are faced with what an agency asserts is an interpretive ruling, the Marshall
case will not be viewed as determinative of the issue. See notes 75-76 and
accompanying text supra.
Moreover, since the courts are not bound by an agency's interpretation
under the legal effect test, the application of the substantial impact test in
this case did not affect the final outcome of the case. For a discussion of the
legal effect test, see notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 72-73 & 92-93 and accompanying text supra.
99. Compare 46 Fed. Reg. 3010 (1981) (indicating that the salary levels
for the long and short tests had been increased as per a "final order") with
46 Fed. Reg. 12,206 (1981) (indicating that the "final order" had been
rescinded and the notice and comment period reopened). No explanation for
the recision of the increase in salary levels is given; however, it is not unreasonable to suppose that pressure from the business community is in part
responsible for the action.
100. If responsibility for the recision of the order increasing the salary
levels of the Regulations can indeed be attributed to the business community,
it seems clear that the same pressures which compelled the recision of that
order could effectively prevent implementation of the workweek as the standard for determining the loss of exempt status for short test managerial employees. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
101. For a discussion of the Brennan decision, see notes 42-51 and accom.
panying text supra. For a discussion of the procedures relating to the APA's
notice and comment provisions, see notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (BOARD)

-

BOARD MUST DEFER TO AN ARBITRATION AWARD WHICH IS
ARGUABLY

CONSISTENT WITH BOARD POLICY.

NLRB v. Pincus Brothers, Inc.- Maxwell (1980)
On February 18, 1977, Jane Richardson was discharged from
,employment at Pincus Brothers, Inc.- Maxwell (Pincus),1 after distributing a one-page leaflet 2 which criticized the company.3 Following her
dismissal, the Philadelphia Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America (Union) instituted grievance proceedings on her behalf
which, under the collective bargaining agreement, ultimately resulted
in arbitration.4 On April 12 1977, the arbitrator ruled that the
company had acted properly in discharging Richardson. 5
Prior to the arbitrator's decision Richardson filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board claiming that
Pincus had violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act
1.Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 237 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1978), enforcement denied, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980). Richardson had worked in the sleeve department of the respondent's men's clothing manufacturing plant from
December 1975 until her discharge on February 18, 1977. 237 N.L.R.B. at
1063. During the course of her employment, Richardson had been an active
member of the Philadelphia Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America (Union). 620 F.2d at 370. On several occasions, she left her work
station to talk with other employees and was directed by her supervisor not
to waste time. Id. Previously, when there was insufficient work to keep all
of the sleeve department employees working a 40-hour week, several employees
and the union business agent asked that Richardson, the least senior member
-of the department, be laid off. Id. At that time, the company refused. Id.
2. 237 N.L.R.B. at 1063. Richardson started to pass out the leaflet in
the plant prior to the 8 A.M. starting time and continued until approximately
8:05 A.M. 620 F.2d at 371. The plant manager claimed work production
was disrupted because of employees reading the leaflet. Id. Richardson was
then fired when she admitted distributing the leaflet. Id.
3. 237 N.L.R.B. at 1063. The leaflet, entitled "WE WON'T SACRIFICE FOR
PINCUS' PROFITS," characterized the February 15, 1977 semi-annual plant meeting as a "circus." Id. It also claimed that Pincus was effectuating pay cuts
by instituting certain changes in operation, and referred to the "lousy style
-of clothes" that Pincus was producing. Id.
4. 620 F.2d at 370-71.
5. 237 N.L.R.B. at 1063. In justifying the discharge, an arbitrator found
-that:
Richardson had (1)abused working time and (2) written a handbill
which she distributed during both working time and nonworking
time which "intentionally misrepresented or distorted facts related to
certain employment practices and business policies and product
status of the company in a denigrating, disparaging fashion so as to
constitute detrimental unprotected disloyalty."

d.

(827)
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(Act) 6 by discharging her for engaging in protected concerted activities.
The Board's General Counsel agreed with the company to submit the
case to the Board for a decision on the question of whether the Board
should defer to the arbitrator's award.7 Relying on the facts as found
by the arbitrator, the Board agreed with the allegations stated in the
grievance and, therefore, concluded that deferral to the arbitrator's
award was not proper.8
In its decision, the Board remanded the case to an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) for a hearing.9 The ALJ found that Pincus had
committed an unfair labor practice in discharging Richardson and
ordered the company to reinstate her.10 After adopting the ALJ's findings and conclusions in a supplemental decision and order, the Board
sought judicial enforcement of its order." The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit 12 denied enforcement of the Board's
order, holding that it is an abuse of the Board's discretion to refuse to
defer to an arbitration award which is arguably consistent with Board
policy. NLRB v. Pincus Brothers, Inc. - Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d
Cir. 1980).
Section 10(a) of the Act gives the Board jurisdiction to adjudicate
complaints of unfair labor practices.' 8 In such adjudications, the Board
6. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 8(a)(1) provides that
"[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (1) to interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
[7] of this title." Id.
Section 7 provides that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ...
Id. § 157. For a further discussion of unfair labor practices,
see note 13 infra.

7. 237 N.L.R.B. at 1063. Pursuant to section 3 of the Act, the Board then
delegated its power to a three-member panel which rendered the decision.
620 F.2d at 371, citing 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976).
8. 237 N.L.R.B. at 1063. The Board concluded that Richardson was
merely stating her opinion in characterizing the semi-annual plant meeting as
a "circus" and in criticizing the level of pay at Pincus. Id. at 1064. The
Board also found that her statements in the handbill were simply attempts to
arouse her fellow workers to fight for higher wages and were not meant to
disparage Pincus' product. Id. at 1065.
9. Id. at 1066. Pincus had requested that, if the Board did not defer to
the arbitration award, the case be remanded to the ALJ for the taking of
additional evidence since the ALJ had refused to admit any evidence regarding Pincus' motivation in discharging Richardson. Id. at 1065.
10. 620 F.2d at 371.
11. Id. The Board has the authority to petition the Court of Appeals for
the circuit in which the unfair labor practice occurred for enforcement of its
order. Id. at 371 n.6, citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
12. The case was heard by Judges Garth, Gibbons, and Rosenn. Judge
Rosenn wrote the majority opinion, Judge Garth wrote a concurring opinion,
and Judge Gibbons wrote a dissenting opinion.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). Section 10(a) provides in pertinent part:
"The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person
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14
is not bound by any prior decision rendered by an arbitrator, but does
15
In exercising
have the discretion to defer to an arbitration award.
this discretion, the Board must comply with its formally announced
In shaping this policy, the Board has attempted to
deferral policy. 1
fulfill both the design of the Act 17 and the national policy favoring the

from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section [8] of this title)
affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means
of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise ...." Id.
Section 8 of the Act proscribes employer conduct which: (1) interferes
with, restrains, or coerces employees in their attempts to unionize under § 7 of
the Act; (2) dominates or interferes with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contributes financial or other support to it; (3)
discriminates in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment which encourages or discourages membership in any
labor organization; (4) discriminates against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under the Act; (5) involves a refusal to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees. Id.
14. See NLRB v. Davol, Inc., 597 F.2d 782 (lst Cir. 1979) (Board retains
the right to prevent unfair labor practices regardless of any other means of
adjustment established by agreement); Hawaiian Hauling Serv., Ltd. v. NLRB,
545 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977) (Board deference
is discretionary); NLRB v. Walt Disney Prods., 146 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 877 (1946) (private agreements cannot restrict the Board's
jurisdiction).
15. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1081 (1955). As the Supreme
Court has stated: "[I]t is . ..well established that the Board has considerable
discretion to respect an arbitration award and decline to exercise its authority
over alleged unfair labor practices if to do so will serve the "fundamental aims
of the Act." Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1963),
quoting International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26 (1962), enforce.
ment granted, Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 1003 (1964). See also William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council,
417 U.S. 12 (1974) (deferral is a matter of Board policy where there is both
an unfair labor practice and a contract violation); NLRB v. Plasterers' Local
Union, No. 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971) (in the context of voluntary arbitration the
Board can defer but is not bound by the Act to do so).
16. NLRB v. Horn 8c Hardart Co., 439 F.2d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 1971). The
Board can change its standards for deference without abusing its discretion,
since its rules regarding deference are self-imposed. Id. However, it cannot
announce a policy and "then blithely ignore it, thereby leading astray litigants who depended upon it." Id.
17. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 830, 840 (1971); Spielberg Mfg.
Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955). The policy of the Act is to:
E]liminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free
ow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these organizations
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise of workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
General Am. Transp. Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 811 (1977) (Murphy Chairman,
concurring), quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
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voluntary settlement of labor disputes 18 through arbitration proceeding. 10 In doing so, however, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
the Board must be careful to protect the public interest in eliminating
unfair labor practices which may be involved when considering the
20
desirability of private arbitration.
The basis for the Board's policy regarding deferral to an arbitration
award was set forth in Spielberg Manufacturing Co. 2 1 While holding
18. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955). (In deferring to
arbitration the Board stated that it was:
[A]djuring the parties to seek resolution of their dispute under the
provisions of their own contract and thus fostering both the collective relationship and the Federal policy favoring voluntary arbitration
and dispute settlement. And by reserving jurisdiction we preserve the
right of the Charging Party to seek from us vindication of statutory
rights should the arbitration reach a result not tolerable under the
statute.
National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 531 (1972).
19. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 927 (1962), enforcement
granted, Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003
(1964). The Act provides that: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon
by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collectivebargaining agreement ......
29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
The Supreme Court has fully endorsed the policy favoring arbitration.
See William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1974);
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), noted in 16 VILL.
L. REV. 176 (1970); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957).
For a general discussion of the role of the arbitrator, see Atleson, Disciplinary Discharges, Arbitration and NLRB Deference, 20 BUFFALO L. REV.
855 (1971); Belcher, Are Arbitrators Qualified to Decide Unfair Labor Practice
Cases, 24 LAB. L.J. 818 (1973); Samoff, Arbitration, Not NLRB Intervention,

18

LAB.

L.J. 602 (1967).

20. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 193 (1941), citing National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940). The arbitrator cannot
provide an adequate remedy for violations of the unfair labor practice provisions of the Act. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 855 (1971)
(Jenkins, Member, dissenting). He can only dispose of an individual case,
rather than settle a principle, and cannot provide a "cease and desist" remedy
or provide other means of effectuating the purposes of the Act, such as posting
notices. Id. The arbitrator is just a "part of a system of self-government
created by and confined to the parties." United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960), quoting Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAxv. L. REv. 999, 1016 (1955). He is
not a "public tribunal" and has "no general charter to administer justice for
a community which transcends the parties." Id. For a further discussion of
the arbitrator's lack of power to provide effective remedies, see Murphy &
Sterlacci, A Review of the National Labor Relations Board's Deferral Policy,
42 FoRDRAm L. REv. 292, 344 (1973).
21. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). The dispute in Spielberg involved the
firing of four employees, allegedly for misconduct on the picket line during a
strike. Id. at 1081. The employees, all members of the Union, admitted calling workers who crossed the picket lines "scabs." Id. at 1084-85. However,
they denied allegations that they used "profane, insulting, or vile language,"
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that it was not bound by the arbitrator's award, the Board stated that
it would defer if: 1) the proceedings had been fair and regular; 2) all
parties had agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's award; and 3) the
decision of the arbitration panel was not "clearly repugnant" to the
23
purposes and policies of the Act. 22 In Collyer Insulated Wire, the
as well as the charges that they committed acts of physical violence toward
other employees. Id. at 1085.
Following an arbitration decision that Spielberg was not obligated to rehire the four employees, the Union filed a complaint with the Board. Id.
at 1081. The complaint charged the company with violating §§ 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) of the Act in discharging employees for engaging in union activities.
Id. at 1080-81.
For the text of § 8(a)(1) and a general discussion of unfair labor practices, see notes 6 & 13 and accompanying text supra. Section 8(a)(3) provides
in pertinent part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (3)
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment of any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
22. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082. Since all three criteria had been met, the Board
found that the desirable objective of encouraging the voluntary settlement of
labor disputes would best be served by deference to the arbitrator's award. Id.
Although the Board has never expressly stated the weight to be given to
each criterion, it can be argued that the "clearly repugnant" standard is the
most important. The design of the Act is to prevent unfair labor practices
and the Board is empowered to carry out the Act. See notes 13 & 17 and
accompanying text supra. Consequently, the Board could never be bound by
an arbitration decision which it finds is supportive of an unfair labor practice.
See Monsanto Chem. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 517 (1951), enforcement granted, 205
F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1953). The other two criteria, however, are also important
and Spielberg indicates that a failure to satisfy each of them independently
could justify the Board's refusal to defer to the arbitrator. 112 N.L.R.B. at
1082. See Wertheimer Stores Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1434, 1435 (1954). Therefore, the Spielberg criteria first allow the Board an opportunity to satisfy
itself that it has fulfilled its statutory duties and subsequently allow the Board
to follow the national policy favoring the voluntary settlement of labor disputes, even if the Board might have decided the issue differently. See 112
N.L.R.B. at 1082. For a discussion of the national policy favoring arbitration,
see notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
23. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). In Collyer, the company was charged with
a section 8(a)(5) violation after it altered its pay scale for skilled employees
without negotiating with the Union, as was required by their collectivebargaining agreement. Id. at 837-39.
Section 8 (a)(5) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer - (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section [9(a)] of
this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
Section 9(a) provides in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment .
Id. § 159(a).
For a further discussion of Collyer, see Getman, Collyer Insulated Wire:
A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49 IND. L.J. 57 (1973); Johannesen & Smith,
Collyer: Open Sesame to Deferral, 23 LAB. L.J. 723 (1972).
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Board expanded its deferral policy by deciding to defer to an arbitration
award, prior to the completion of the arbitration proceedings, 24 where
25
the contract prescribed a complete and fully effective remedy.
Following Collyer, the Board has decided that it would defer only
when either pure contractual issues are involved 26 or when there is
clear proof that the arbitrator considered both the contractual and
unfair labor practice issues. 27 In General American Transportation
24. 192 N.L.R.B. at 839. The Board stated that since contractual issues
were involved, the dispute could "better be resolved by arbitrators with special
skill and experience in deciding matters arising under established bargaining
relationships than by the application by this Board of a particular provision
of our statute." Id. The Board, however, did retain jurisdiction, so that it
could entertain a motion for further consideration should the arbitrator's
findings be found to be inconsistent with the Spielberg standard. Id. at 843.
25. Id. at 839. The Board summarized its decision by stating four reasons
why deferral was appropriate: 1) pure contract issues were involved; 2) the
parties had a long and successful bargaining relationship; 3) the parties were
not opposed to the use of arbitration; and 4) there was no claim of enmity
by the company to the employees' exercise of their protected rights. Id. at
842.
26. See, e.g., Croation Fraternal Union, 232 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1977); Roy
Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. 828 (1977).
In Croation, § 8(a) (5) and, derivatively, § 8(a)(1) charges were filed against
the employer, claiming that, in disregard of its good-faith bargaining obligations to the Union, it unilaterally and without prior notice or consultation
with the Union, permanently subcontracted work previously performed by
its employees and terminated employees; forbade employees from holding any
more union meetings on the company's premises; and prohibited employees
from further use of the telephones at the company's premises. 232 N.L.R.B.
at 1010. In deciding to defer, the Board stated that, as Board law stood in
1977, in a § 8(a)(5) case where a "substantial" question of contract interpretation lies at the core of the dispute and the resolution of that question by
an arbitrator will also resolve the unfair labor practice issue, "a showing that
the matters in the controversy arguably fall within the ambit of a contract's
arbitration clause is enough to invoke application of the Board's deferral
policy." Id. at 1014.
In Roy Robinson, §§ 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) charges were brought against the
company after it closed its body shop and discharged certain employees without prior notice to and bargaining with the Union. 228 N.L.R.B. at 828. In
reaching its decision to defer, the Board reviewed the status of Collyer, and
held that it still requires deferral where there is an issue of contract interpretation, a § 8(a)(5) charge, and an established grievance procedure culminating in arbitration for resolution of issues of contract interpretation. Id. at
829.
For the text and a further discussion of § 8(a)(l), see notes 6 & 13 supra.
For the text of § 8(a)(5), see note 23 supra.
27. Airco Indus. Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. 676 (1972). In Airco, an employee
was terminated because of negligence, failure to follow instructions, and his
past work record. Id. at 676. Upon receiving notice of his termination, the
employee filed a grievance and the Union filed §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) charges
alleging that his discharge was unwarranted by past company practice. Id.
At the arbitration hearing, the parties agreed that the issue was whether the
discharge was due to the employee's union activities. Id. The arbitrator concluded that the employee had been guilty of negligence, but that the discharge
should be reduced to a suspension without pay. Id. The Board, finding no
indication in the arbitrator's opinion and award that he considered the issue
of a discriminatory discharge, held that deferral in such a case "would result
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Co.,28 the Board further refined its position by stating that it would
defer only when there is a pure contract dispute and where "there is no
alleged interference with individual employees' basic rights under
Section 7 of the Act." 29
in an extension of the Spielberg doctrine which we are unwilling to make."

Id. at 676-77. For the text of § 8(a)(3), see note 21 supra.
Where there are contractual and statutory unfair labor practice issues.
present, the resolution of the contractual issue must be congruent with the
resolution of the statutory issue for the Board to defer without abdicating its
statutory duties. Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 345-46 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
In 1974, the Board overruled Airco stating that, in order to uphold the
Spielberg doctrine, full effect must be given to arbitration awards in cases dealing with discipline or discharge, except when unusual circumstances show that

there should not be a deferral.

Electronic Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213

N.L.R.B. 758 (1974). However, in Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., the Board
overruled Electronic Reproduction and returned to the standard used in Airco.
247 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 103 L.R.R.M. 1113, 1114 (1980).
In Suburban Motor Freight, the Board stated that its former policies under
Electronic Reproduction promoted the statutory purpose of encouraging collective-bargaining relationships, but derogated the equally important purpose of

protecting employees in the exercise of their rights under § 7 of the Act. 103

L.R.R.M. at 1114. In holding that it can no longer "adhere to a doctrine
which forces employees in arbitration proceeding to seek simultaneous vindication of private contractual rights and public statutory rights, or risk waiving the latter," the Board noted that, since the union's interests may not
coincide with the individuals', it cannot deprive the "individual employees of
their statutory rights under the guise of deferring to and encouraging arbitration." Id., quoting Schatzski, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and
the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 897, 909 n.32 (1975).
28. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
29. 228 N.L.R.B. at 810 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring). The complaint
filed in General American alleged that an employee was laid off because he
was active in the Union. Id. at 819. The company urged that the §§ 8(a)(3)
and 8(a)(l) allegations be deferred to arbitration in accordance with Collyer.
Id. at 808. The case was heard by the full Board, with a resulting two-onetwo split. In dissent, Members Penello and Walther claimed that deferral
was proper under Collyer. Id. at 813-19 (Penello & Walther, Members, dissenting). Members Fanning and Jenkins, writing for the majority, argued that
deferral was inappropriate since the Board "has a statutory duty to hear and
to dispose of unfair labor practices and . .. cannot abdicate or avoid its duty
by seeking to cede its jurisdiction to private tribunals." Id. They continued
their reasoning by criticizing the Collyer doctrine and claiming that it stripped
employees of their statutory rights by forcing them into arbitration. Id. at
809. Chairman Murphy concurred in the result reached by Members Fanning
and Jenkins, but disagreed with the portion of their rationale denying the
Board any discretion to defer. Id. at 810 (Murphy, Chairman concurring).
As a result of this split, Chairman Murphy's views have been recognized as

controlling the deferral policies of the Board. See Roy Robinson Chevrolet,

Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 828, 831-32 (1977) (Chairman Murphy joining Members

Penello and Walther in deciding that deferral is appropriate in a pure contract dispute case).
In her concurring opinion, Chairman Murphy discussed the Board's policy
regarding deferral. Id. at 810-13 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring). She stated
that the Board should not defer when the dispute is between the employee and
the employer or union. Id. at 810 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring). Deferral
is proper, however, when the dispute is based on conduct assertedly in deroga-

tion of the contract and the principal issue is whether the complained-of con-

duct is permitted by the parties' contract.

Id.

Chairman Murphy stated that
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When a Board decision on the facts is reviewed by a Court of
Appeals,3 0 the decision may be reversed if it is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.3 1 However, in reviewing
Board decisions on deferral to an arbitrator's award, the courts must
ensure that the Board adheres to its self-imposed restraints on its dis33
cretion,3 2 and can overturn the Board if it has abused that discretion.
The abuse of discretion standard is viewed as proper because the Board's
policies on deferral are not mandated by law, but rather are self34
imposed.
The majority of the Courts of Appeals which have considered the
issue have held that the Board has considerable discretion regarding
deferral was not proper when statutory rights were involved because: 1)it
does not further the fundamental aims of the Act since the prosecution of
those rights is the very reason for the Board's existence; 2) an aggrieved employee has no standing to "compel the union to process the grievance through
arbitration if the grievance is resolved against the employee," thus allowing
the union "wide discretion in determining which grievances to pursue to
arbitration and which to abandon or to trade off in favor of some other advantage"; 3) at arbitration, the employee is merely a third party and has no
standing to participate as a party, to have counsel different from union counsel, to examine witnesses, or to submit evidence; and 4) the arbitrator generally
is authorized only to determine the contract issue presented by the grievance.
Id. at 812-13 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring). For a criticism of Chairman
Murphy's reasoning, see Covington, Arbitrators and the Board: A Revised
Relationship,57 N.C.L. REV. 91, 102-03 (1978).
30. A court of appeals may review a Board decision when the Board petitions the court for enforcement of its order, pursuant to § 10(e). 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(e) (1976). The Board's decision may also be reviewed when "[a]ny person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or
in part the relief sought" appeals the decision pursuant to § 10(f). Id. § 160(f).
31. Id. § 160(e-f). Section 10(e) states in pertinent part: "The findings of
the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole shall be conclusive." Id. § 160(e). Similar language
appears in § 10(f). Id. § 160(f). See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951); NLRB v. American Postal Workers Union, 618 F.2d
1249, 1254 (8th Cir. 1980).
32. Hawaiian Hauling Serv., Ltd. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977). For a discussion of the Board's selfimposed restraints, see notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra.
33. Hawaiian Hauling Serv., Ltd. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977). See also Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v.
NLRB, 587 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1978); Local 700, Machinists Union v.
NLRB, 525 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Horn & Hardart Co., 439
F.2d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 1971). Use of the abuse of discretion standard does
not preclude use of the substantial evidence standard, since a party appealing
the Board's decision on deferral can also claim that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Hawaiian Hauling
Serv., Ltd. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d at 676 n.4.
34. NLRB v. Horn & Hardart Co., 439 F.2d 674, 678-79 (2d Cir. 1971).
In first establishing a deferral policy in Spielberg, the Board recognized that,
while deferral was not required, it would exercise its discretion to defer, since
deferral would best serve the desirable objective of encouraging the voluntary
settlement of labor disputes. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082. For
a further discussion of Spielberg, see notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
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deferral.3 5 Board orders refusing to defer have been upheld where the
award is repugnant to the Act,36 where the unfair labor practice issue
was not "clearly decided" by the arbitrator,3 7 and where the arbitration
proceedings were not "even-handed." 38 On the other hand, a Board
order refusing to defer was overturned by the Ninth Circuit in Douglas
Aircraft Co. v. NLRB. a9 In Douglas, the arbitrator had supplied two
reasons why an employee's backpay was properly withheld by the
company.4 0 Of the two reasons, only one could independently justify
the company's actions.4 1 The Board, however, refused to defer, finding
the arbitrator's award to be clearly repugnant to the purposes and
policies of the Act.42

The Ninth Circuit overturned the Board's de-

cision, holding that if an arbitration award can plausibly be interpreted
35. See NLRB v. Owners Maint. Corp., 581 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978) (no
requirement that the Board must invariably defer); NLRB v. Columbus Print-

ing Pressmen, 543 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1976) (Board can at any time exercise
its jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, regardless of arbitration proceedings); NLRB v. Horn & Hardart Co., 439 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1971) (Board does
not have to "automatically" defer).
36. See, e.g., NLRB v. Owners Maint. Corp., 581 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978)
(arbitrator found that the stated reason for employees' dismissal was insufficient,
but held that the discharge did not violate § 8(a)(3) because it was not a

discrimination based on union membership, even though the employees were
dismissed for union activity).
37. See, e.g., Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977), afJ'd after

remand, 614 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1980) (no evidence that the unfair labor
practice issue was either raised or considered at the arbitration proceeding).
38 T.I.M.E. - DC, Inc. v. NLRB, 504 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1974). The
T.I.M.E. - DC court stated that "[w]here both the employer and the union
are hostile to an employee's interests, the Board has properly refused to defer
to an arbitral or grievance procedure invoked and administered by the employer and the union." Id. at 302.

39. 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit had also overturned
the Board's refusal to defer in Servair, Inc. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 258 (9th Cir.

1979) (withdrawn from publication, pending rehearing).

Servair, however,

has since been remanded to the Board for further consideration and application of the Spielberg doctrine. Servair, Inc. v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 92 (9th Cir.
1980).
40. 609 F.2d at 353. The employee had originally been discharged and
the arbitrator ordered his reinstatement, but denied him backpay. Id. The
two reasons for his decision were the employee's pattern of abusive and uncivil
conduct and the employee's refusal to agree to a settlement worked out by the
company and the union which called for reinstatement, arbitration of the
backpay issue, and withdrawal of the unfair labor practice charge. Id.
41. Id. The company and the union had jointly requested that the arbitrator clarify his original decision. Id. He responded that there was no

evidence that the employee had been discharged for union activities, and that
the two reasons for denying backpay were each independent and sufficient. Id.
The arbitrator's holding that the employee had a pattern of abusive and uncivil conduct was found to be sufficient to uphold the award, while his decision
that the employee should be denied backpay for refusing to agree to a settlement was found to be repugnant to the Act. Id. at 354.
42. Id. at 353. The Board had interpreted the arbitrator's original decision as resting upon both of the stated reasons, and viewed the clarification
procedure as "result-reaching" and "prejudicial." Id. at 354.
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as consistent with the Act, then, because such an award is not "clearly
43
repugnant" to the Act, deference is required.
In its attempt to deal with the question of Board deferral, the
District of Columbia Circuit fashioned a test along the lines of current
Board policy. 44 In Banyard v. NLRB, 45 a case dealing with the dismissal of an employee in violation of his union contract, the court
enunciated two additional factors which must be added to the requirements for deferral under Spielberg: 1) the arbitration tribunal must
have clearly decided the issue on which the Board is asked to give
deference; and 2) the tribunal must have decided an issue within its
40
competence.
43. Id. at 354-55. See also Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
The court explained that such a practice helps effectuate the federal policy
favoring arbitration and prevents the overzealous dissection of opinions which
can deter arbitrators from writing full opinions. 609 F.2d at 355. For a
discussion of Spielberg, see notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
44. For a discussion of current Board policy regarding deferral, see notes
21-29 and accompanying text supra.
45. 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Banyard, an employee, who was
also the Union's appointed shop steward, was fired for refusing to drive a
truck when to do so would have been admittedly in violation of Ohio state
law. Id. at 343. The contract between the company and the Union provided that "employees would not be required to violate any applicable statute
or a governmental regulation relating to safety." Id. at 343-44 (footnote
omitted). Pursuant to the contract, the Union had prosecuted the employee's
grievance through two stages of the grievance procedure when the employee
filed §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) charges with the Board. Id. at 344. After the
Union's claim was denied at the final stage of the contract grievance procedure, the Board decided to dismiss the unfair labor practice complaint and
defer to the decision of the National Grievance Procedure under the Spielberg
doctrine. Id. The court reversed the Board's decision, holding that the
Spielberg and Collyer doctrines are only to be applied "where the resolution
of the contractual issues is congruent with the resolution of the statutory unfair
labor practice issues." Id.
For a further discussion of Spielberg and Collyer, see notes 21-25 and
accompanying text supra.
46. 505 F.2d at 347. This new "five-prong" test was also adopted by the
Ninth Circuit in Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977), afl'd
after remand, 614 F.2d 1210 (1980). The Stephenson court further explained
these two additional requirements:
The "clearly decided" requirement means that the arbitrator's
decision must specifically deal with the statutory issue. Merely because the arbitrator is presented with a problem which involves both
contractual and unfair labor practice elements does not necessarily
mean that he will adequately consider the statutory issue, and merely
because he considers the statutory issue does not mean that he will
enforce the rights of the parties pursuant to and consistent with
the Act. The "clearly decided" requisite is designed to enable the
Board and the courts to fairly test the standards applied by the arbitrator against those required by the Act ....
The "competence" criterion . . . arises from the belief that defer-

ence is appropriate only where there is a congruence between the
statutory and contractual issues. .

.

.

[It] requires the Board to as-

certain the underlying issues in the unfair labor practice charges and
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In Radio Television Technical School, Inc. v. NLRB, 47 the Third
Circuit was presented with a dispute which centered around section
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) charges 4 that the company had discontinued
Christmas payments to Union employees without bargaining with the
Union.4 9 The Board refused to defer to the arbitration award on the
ground that it had ignored a long line of Board and court precedent. 50
In upholding the Board's refusal to defer, the Third Circuit recognized
that Board deferral is strictly voluntary, 51 and that "where the Board
disagrees with the decision of the arbitrator, 'the Board's ruling would,
of course, take precedence ....... 52
Against this background, the Pincus court began its analysis by
stating that the Board's decision not to defer to the arbitration award
could only be overturned if it constituted an abuse of discretion. 58 In
order to determine whether the Board had abused its discretion, the
court found it necessary to decide whether the arbitration award was
to determine whether arbitral expertise and institutional competence
justify deferral to arbitration of a particular statutory dispute.
550 F.2d at 538 n.4.
47. 488 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1973).
48. 488 F.2d at 459. For the text of § 8(a)(1), see note 6 supra. For a
further discussion of unfair labor practices, see note 13 supra. For the text
of § 8(a)(5), see note 23 supra.
49. 488 F.2d at 459. The compnay had been giving its employees Christmas gifts since 1950. Id. In 1965 or 1966, the company began making these
gifts in the form of money payments but withheld making the payments
in 1970 to employees who had joined the Union the past summer. Id. All
non-union employees, however, still received their Christmas payments. Id.

50. Id. at 461.

The arbitrator found that the payments were made at

the company's discretion, and therefore, could legally be discontinued with-

out subjecting the matter to the collective bargaining process. Id. Past
Board and court decisions, however, had held that such gifts, when made over
a substantial period of time and when based on the respective wages earned
by the recipients, were actually "wages," thus requiring the matter to be
submitted to the collective bargaining process. Id. at 460-61. See, e.g., NLRB
v. Electric Steam Radiator Corp., 321 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB v.
Wheeling Pipe Line, 229 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Niles-Bement
Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952).
51. 488 F.2d at 461. See also notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
52. 488 F.2d at 461, citing Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S.

261, 272 (1964).

Other Third Circuit cases which have addressed the issue

of Board deferral to arbitration awards include: Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
Corp., 618 F.2d 1009, 1015 (3d Cir. 1980) (Board does not abuse its discretion
in considering the unfair labor practice issue when deferral is not raised as
an affirmative defense); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 491 F.2d 388, 395
n.9 (3d Cir. 1974) (same); Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123,
1128 (3d Cir. 1969) (recognizing the "strong public policy of encouraging the

peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by means of the device of arbitration").
53. 620 F.2d at 372.

The court noted that since Spielberg is a discretion-

ary administrative doctrine and not a legislative or judicial standard of Board
deferral, the Board's failure to defer can only be reversed for an abuse of
discretion. Id. at 372 n.8. For a further discussion of the proper standard of
review, see notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
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"clearly repugnant" to the Act. 54 In making this decision, the court
first examined the source of the Board's deferral policy.55 Noting the
congressional preference for the private settlement of disputes,56 the
court stressed the fact that, in formulating its deferral policy, the Board
was attempting to effectuate the national policy favoring arbitration. 57
The court also emphasized the voluntary nature of arbitration and the
Board's desire to hold parties to their contractual commitments. 58
Following its examination of the policy behind arbitration, the
Pincus court advanced three reasons why deference is proper: 1) "the
societal rewards of arbitration outweigh a need for uniformity of result
or a correct resolution of the dispute in every case"; 2) the parties are
not injured by deference since they have selected and agreed to be
Judge Garth's opinion that Board decisions should be reviewed under an
error of law standard, see notes 63-68 and accompanying text infra.
54. 620 F.2d at 372. The court viewed this as the determinative issue in
the case, as the parties had agreed that the proceedings were fair and regular
and that they agreed to be bound, thus fulfilling two of the three criteria of
the Spielberg standard. Id. at 371-72. The court also noted that the arbitration decision clearly showed that the arbitrator considered and ruled upon the
unfair labor practice issue. Id. at 372 n.7.
For a further discussion of the Spielberg criteria, see notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra. For a further discussion of the importance of the
arbitration ruling on the unfair labor practice issue, see notes 27 C44-46 and
accompanying text supra.
55. 620 F.2d at 372-73.

56. Id. at 372, citing 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976) (calling for the voluntary
settlement of disputes). For the text of § 173(d), see note 19 supra.
57. 620 F.2d at 373. The court stated:
If complete effectuation of the Federal policy is to be achieved,
we firmly believe that the Board ... should give hospitable acceptance
to the arbitral process as "part and parcel of the collective bargaining
process itself," and voluntarily withhold its undoubted authority to

adjudicate alleged unfair labor practice charges involving the same
subject matter, unless it clearly appears that the arbitration proceedings were tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness, or serious procedural
irregularities or that the award was clearly repugnant to the purposes
and policies of the Act.
Id., quoting International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 926-27 (1962),
enforcement granted, Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 1003 (1964). For a discussion of this national policy, favoring voluntary arbitration see notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra. According

to the Pincus court, recognition of the national policy "[a]t the very least
means that the interpretation of labor arbitrators must not be disturbed so
long as they are not in 'manifest disregard' of the law, and that 'whether the
arbitrators misconstrued a contract' does not open the award to judicial review.'" 620 F.2d at 374, quoting Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405
F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969).
58. 620 F.2d at 373. The court stated: "We are not compelling any party
to agree to arbitrate disputes arising during a contract term, but are merely
giving full effect to their own voluntary agreements to submit all such disputes
to arbitration, rather than permitting such agreements to be side-stepped ......
Id., quoting Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. at 842. For a discussion
of Collyer, see notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
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bound by the arbitration process; and 3) deference will effectuate the
intent of the parties in the collective bargaining agreement and avoid
59
The
the time, expense, and inconvenience of duplicative proceedings.
court further noted that the parties should be bound by an arbitration
award which has been rendered and is arguably consistent with Board
policy, since "[t]he parties accepted the risk that arbitration results
could differ from Board decisions when they elected to proceed by
arbitration and the Board recognized such possibilities when it adopted
the policy to defer to an arbitrator's award." 60
The Pincus court went on to hold that the Board abuses its discretion when it does not defer to an arbitration award which can
arguably be reconciled with the policies of the Board. 61 The court
concluded that, because Richardson's activity was arguably not protected under section 8(a)(1), the arbitrator's decision was not "clearly
repugnant" to the Act, and, therefore, that the Board abused its dis62
cretion in not deferring to the award.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Garth agreed that the arbitration
award was not "clearly repugnant" to the purposes and policies of the
Act, but disagreed as to the proper standard of review for Board decisions. 63 In discussing the conflict between the Board's power to
59. 620 F.2d at 374.
60. Id. at 374-75.
61. Id. at 374. The court concluded that "[i]f the reasoning behind an
award is susceptible of two interpretations, one permissible and one impermissible, it is simply not true that the award was 'clearly repugnant' to the
Act." Id., quoting Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d at 354. For a
discussion of Douglas, see notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra.
In Pincus, the arbitrator held that Richardson's discharge was proper since
she had abused working time and had written the handbill which intentionally misrepresented facts. 620 F.2d at 371. The discharge could have been
permissible under the first reason; but the Board found the second reason impermissible, and refused to defer since dismissal under the second reason
constituted a violation under § 7 of the Act. 237 N.L.R.B. at 1063-65. For
the text of § 7, see note 6 supra.
62. 620 F.2d at 375-77. The court provided four reasons why Richardson's
activities were arguably unprotected: 1)an employee loses the protection of
the Act where his or her statements are "deliberately or maliciously false," and
the arbitrator's findings that the semi-annual plant meeting served legitimate
and constructive purposes, that the company was not instituting pay cuts, and
that the working conditions and clothes produced at Pincus Brothers were
among the best in the industry, make it at least arguable that Richardson's
leaflet can be labeled as "defamatory or insulting material known to be false";
2) her actions arguably constituted unprotected disloyalty since the arbitrator
found that the leaflet tarnished the image and impeded the legitimate business
goals of the company; 3) her activity was inconsistent with the fundamental
policy of the Act as her activities were intended to interfere with the company's long-established collective bargaining relationship with the Union; and
4) a single employee acting alone is not engaged in "concerted activity" within
the meaning of the Act. Id. at 375-77 (citations omitted).
For a discussion and the text of § 8(a)(1), see notes 6 & 13 supra.
63. 620 F.2d at 377 (Garth, J., concurring).
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decide unfair labor practice charges under section 10(a) 64 and the
congressional desire for voluntary settlement of disputes under section
173(d) of the Act, 65 Judge Garth concluded that the Board does have

the discretion to formulate a policy of deference to arbitration awards. 68
According to Judge Garth, however, once the Board announces a policy,
it is bound by that policy and its original discretion under section
10(a) is displaced. 67 Consequently, he argued, the proper standard of
review in unfair labor practice cases is one of legal error, since the
Spielberg doctrine does not confer any additional discretion upon the
Board. 68
In a strong dissent, Judge Gibbons asserted that, under the terms
of the Act, the Board has the power to defer only when the unfair
labor practice charge is that employees are striking for work acquisition.69 In any other situation, he contended, deferral constitutes a
failure by the Board to exercise its proper jurisdiction.7 0 In con64. Id. at 378 (Garth, J., concurring). For a discussion and the text of
§ 10(a), see note 13 and accompanying text supra.
65. 620 F.2d at 378 (Garth, J., concurring). For the text of § 173(d), see
note 19 supra.
66. 620 F.2d at 378 (Garth, J., concurring). Judge Garth stated that the
Board's original discretion is a result of the inherent tension between two
separate congressional pronouncements, one requiring the Board to prevent
unfair labor practices and the other calling for Board approval of voluntary
arbitration agreements. Id. Consequently, the Board has the freedom to work
out a policy on deference which rests somewhere between the two congressional extremes. Id.
67. Id. at 379 (Garth, J., concurring). judge Garth does note, however,
that the Board does retain the power to explicitly change its policy. Id. at 380
(Garth, J., concurring). The loss of original discretion concerns the Board's
obligation to apply its formally announced policy. Id. at 379 (Garth, J.,
concurring).
68. Id. at 380-81 (Garth, J., concurring). Judge Garth contended that the
Spielberg doctrine requires the Board to determine only whether the three
parts of the test are satisfied, each of which ultimately involves a nondiscre-

tionary question of law. Id. at 381 (Garth, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 386-87 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Section 158(b)(4)(D) makes it
an unfair labor practice for employees to strike for work acquisition. 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D). The Board is given special authority to deal with such
strikes under section 10(k), which provides:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section
158(b) of this title, the Board is empowered and directed to hear and
determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall
have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such charge has
been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory
evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the

voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance of the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.
29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1976).
70. 620 F.2d at 386-87 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons relied
upon an interpretation of § 10(c) which provides that the Board must decide
whether there has been a violation of the Act when the General Counsel files
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sidering the Board's deferral policy, Judge Gibbons claimed that deferral to arbitration is improper since it saves no time, effort, or cost
in the administrative process; 71 and its application in any given case
is unpredictable. 72 He further contended that arbitration does not
fulfill the public policy demands required of the Board. 73 The dissent
concluded that if deferral is proper in any circumstances, it is only so
when the issues concerning the contractual and statutory rights are
congruent.7 4 In any other situation, argued Judge Gibbons, deferral
forces the Board to abdicate its statutory duty to protect employees in
75
the exercise of their section 7 rights.
It is submitted that the Pincus decision extends the Board's deferral policy to cases in which the Board would hold that the unfair
an unfair labor practice complaint. Id. at 386 (Gibbons, J., dissenting), citing
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
71. 620 F.2d at 389 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons stated that,
in unfair labor practice cases, an initial investigation is always made to determine whether the charge should be prosecuted. Id. Consequently, when a
decision to defer is made at a later time, the administrative resources have
already been expended. Id.
72. Id. Judge Gibbons stated that the unpredictability is due to the
Board's freedom to decide not to defer when its standards are not met. Id. at
389-90 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 390 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons stated:
Obviously a remedy selected by an arbitrator in processing an individual grievance may be wholly inadequate to enforce the public
policy against unfair labor practices. Reinstatement of a single victim
of a discharge for engaging in protected activity, for example, may
afford no protection for other potential victims of similar discrimination, while a Board order could afford such protection. Finally, inas-

much as an arbitrator is not even required to prepare findings of fact,
there may be instances in which the reasons for his decision, and

thus its consistency with the policies behind the Act are both unknown
and unknowable. A policy of absolute deferral would be plainly
inconsistent with the Board's public responsibilities.
Id. For a discussion of those public policy demands, see notes 17-20 and
accompanying text supra.

74. 620 F.2d at 392-94 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).

Judge Gibbons noted

that the Board has recognized a difference between contractual and statutory
issues and has since altered its policy on deferral to reflect that change. Id.
at 392 (Gibbons, J., dissenting), citing General Am. Transp. Co., 228 N.L.R.B.
at 810-11 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring).
For a further discussion of the Board's current deferral policy, see notes
21-29 and accompanying text supra.
75. 620 F.2d at 394 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons also stated
that contract arbitration does not provide adequate protection for the statutory rights of all employees. Id. at 399 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). First, if
there is no congruence of interest between the majority and minorities in the
bargaining unit, the provisions of the contract will usually reflect majority
concerns. Id. "Second, the typical contract places control of the grievancearbitration mechanism in the practical control of the union or the employer,
again to the detriment of the protection of minority rights." Id. Finally,
there is almost no judicial review of arbitration decisions, thus preventing the

judiciary from protecting the minority's viewpoint. Id.
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labor practice charge was not properly decided.76 The basis for this
decision was a desire to hold the Board to its formally announced policy
on deferral.77 It is suggested, however, that in reaching its decision the
court overlooked the changes which have occurred in the Board's de9
ferral policy following its decisions in Spielberg 78 and Collyer7

While

the Board still employs the Spielberg criteria, it has added a requirement that, in cases involving both issues of contractual and statutory
rights, there must be evidence that both issues were decided by the
arbitrator.8 0 As a result, the Board often finds deferral to be appropriate in pure contract dispute cases such as Collyer, but is reluctant to defer in any case involving an unfair labor practice issue.81
It is further submitted that the Pincus court's failure to consider
the changes in the Board's deferral policy created other problems in
its analysis. First, the court relies upon the national policy favoring
76. See notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the

reasons why the Board thought deferral was improper, see note 8 supra.
77. 620 F.2d at 372. For a discussion of the Board's policy on deferral,
see notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra.
78. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). For a discussion of Spielberg, see notes
21-22 and accompanying text supra.
79. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). For a discussion of Collyer, see notes 23-25
and accompanying text supra.
80. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 103 L.R.R.M.
1113, 1114 (1980). In Suburban Motor Freight, the Board stated: "In specific
terms, we will no longer honor the results of an arbitration proceeding under

Spielberg unless the unfair labor practice issue before the Board was both

presented to and considered by the arbitrator"

103 L.R.R.M. at 1114. For a

further discussion of Suburban Motor Freight, see note 27 supra.
The requirement set down in Suburban Motor Freight was discussed in
Croation Fraternal Union, 232 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1977), where the Board stated
its position was that where the resolution of the contract dispute will also
resolve the unfair labor practice issue, deferral is proper upon a showing that
the controversy falls within the contract's arbitration clause. 232 N.L.R.B. at
1014. See note 26 supra.
It is submitted that, in Pincus, deferral was improper since the unfair
labor practice claim could not be resolved by an interpretation of the contract.
The fact that the arbitrator did rule on the unfair labor practice issue does
not defeat a claim against deferral, since the Board has exclusive jurisdiction
over unfair labor practice claims under § 10(a). 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
As stated previously, the Board can defer to the arbitrator in such a case if
it so chooses, but deferral is not required and where the Board disagrees with
the arbitrator, the Board's ruling is controlling. Radio Television Technical
School, Inc. v. NLRB, 488 F.2d at 461, citing Carey v. Westinghouse Elec.

Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964).

See notes 47-52 and accompanying text supra.

For the text of § 10(a), see note 13 supra.
81. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra. In Pincus, the sole
issue was an unfair labor practice claim. 620 F.2d at 371. Richardson's argument was that she had been discharged for engaging in concerted activities.

Id. The issue was not whether the complained-of conduct was permitted by
the parties' contract, as is required for deferral to be proper. General Am.
Transp. Co., 228 N.L.R.B. at 810 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring).
For a further discussion of General American, see notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra. For a further discussion of unfair labor practice claims,
see notes 6 & 13 supra.
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the settlement of labor disputes through arbitration,82 but does not
discuss the Board's decision not to follow the national policy when
deferral to arbitration fails to provide adequate protection for employees' statutory rights. 88

Consequently, it is suggested that Pincus

does not provide the protection for individual employees which the
Board is required to provide under section 10(a).84 Second, the court
finds great importance in the voluntary nature of the arbitration
process.8 5 In resting its argument on Collyer, however, the court does
not consider the possibility that, in statutory rights cases, an employee
may not wish to seek his remedies through arbitration, and by thus
requiring deferral the court actually forces an employee into the
arbitration process.86
It is also submitted that in transferring greater power to the
arbitrator, the Pincus court failed to consider many of the problems
surrounding the arbitration process.87 It is suggested that, although
arbitrators may aid in the collective bargaining process,8s the Board is
capable of rendering more consistent judgments, can provide better
fact finding procedures, and is more knowledgeable about industrial
relations. 8 9 Also, while arbitrators may be more skilled in deciding
82. 620 F.2d at 372. For a discussion of this policy, see notes 18-19 and
accompanying text supra.
83. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 103 L.R.R.M.
1113, 1114 (1980). For a further discussion of Suburban Motor Freight, see
note 27 supra.

84. See notes 13-20 and accompanying text supra.
85. 620 F.2d at 373.
86. A situation similar to this existed in General American Transp. Co.,
228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977). In General American, the employee thought that his
pursuit of a remedy for his discrimination discharge would be futile. Id. at
808. In discussing the possibility of deferral, the Board stated:
Were we to order deferral in these circumstanecs, there would be
nothing voluntary about the arbitration to which [he] would be
forced. Hence the voluntary nature of arbitration, long trumpeted
by the Collyer enthusiasts as the main reason for deferral, is revealed
as a sham in cases . . . where the charging party is an individual

discriminatee seeking to enforce his individual rights.
Id. at 808-09. Consequently, the fact that the Union agrees to submit the
dispute to arbitration should not foreclose the Board from reviewing the dispute. Id. at 808.
For a discussion of some of the problems surrounding the individual employee in arbitration, see note 29 supra.
87. See Murphy & Sterlacci, supra note 20, at 344.
88. Id. Arbitrators can aid in the collective bargaining process by eliminating the disruptive impact upon the process which results from Board intervention and by bringing in their purported expertise in deciding contract
issues. Id. at 341. See also Samoff, supra note 19.
89. Getman, supra note 23, at 63. Professor Getman argues that the
Board is better qualified to decide cases for four reasons: 1) the Board has
better fact-finding procedures and investigatory resources; 2) the arbitrator usually knows only who the parties are, what the dispute concerns, and what the
contract says, and he is normally unable to understand any of the practical
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pure contract issues, some doubt exists as to their ability to decide
statutory rights cases.90 Therefore, it is suggested that deferral is inappropriate where unfair labor practices are involved, unless the Board
is given some ultimate opportunity to review the legal issues raised by
the case.9 1 It is submitted that by failing to balance the merits of
arbitration against the merit of Board decisions, the Pincus court disregarded an important part of the deferral issue and has effectively
reduced the Board's powers without analyzing the possible effects of
the reduction.
As a result of Pincus, it is suggested that the Third Circuit will
refrain from giving full regard to the statutory powers delegated to the
Board.9 2 It is submitted that decisions requiring the Board to defer to
an arbitration award could cause the erosion of the Board's jurisdiction
in unfair labor practice cases, 93 the effect of which would be a lessening
94
of employee protection and greater opportunities for employer abuse.
consequences of his interpretations; 3) the Board is a stable body and can
reach consistent decisions on similar issues, while arbitration involves thousands
of co-equal decisionmakers who rarely try to achieve consistency with one
another; and 4) the Board is more familiar with its own rules and can more
easily decide cases in a manner consistent with national labor relations policy.
Id.

See also Atleson, supra note 10.

90. See Belcher, supra note 19; Murphy & Sterlacci, supra note 20, at
344. Some doubt exists in this area because most arbitrators do not have
any legal training, or any NLRB staff experience. Belcher, supra, at 819.
Consequently, they may be asked to decide issues which they do not really
understand. Id. There is also some concern as to the age of the arbitrators,
as the majority of them are over 60 years old. Id. For a contrary view, see
Covington, supra note 29, at 106-10.
91. This approach comports with current Board policy. See notes 21-29
and accompanying text supra. Also, after review, the Board can still defer
if it so chooses, even in an unfair labor practice case. See notes 14-15 and
accompanying text supra. If, however, the Board disagrees with the arbitrator's findings, it could set the award aside and its decision could only be overturned upon a showing that the decision is not supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole or that the Board has abused its discretion.
See notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
Applying these principles to Pincus, it is submitted that deferral is inappropriate, as the Board did review the case and did disagree with the arbitrator; yet the Pincus court overturned the decision simply on the ground that
the arbitrator's decision was "arguably" correct. See 620 F.2d at 377.
92. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra.
93. Since the Board's jurisdiction is defined by statute and the national
policy favoring arbitration is also stated in a statute, there must be some tension whenever the Board asserts its jurisdiction in refusing to defer to an
arbitrator's award. Consequently, as long as the courts resolve the stiuation
by deciding in favor of the national policy, the Board's jurisdiction over unfair
labor practices, where arbitration is involved, is necessarily restricted.
For a discussion of the Board's statutory powers, see note 13 supra. For
a discussion of the national policy favoring arbitration, see note 19 supra.
94. Without Board protection for employees, arbitration would be the
only forum in which employees could have their grievances heard. The possibilities of injustice, such as where the Union refuses to prosecute a grievance,
must then necessarily increase. This problem is compounded by the fact that
there is limited review of an arbitrator's decision, and hence, little opportunity
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It is suggested, however, that the effect of Pincus will be to force the
Board to clearly state an alternate policy on deferral.9 5 In this manner,
the Board could retain its statutory power, as well as formulate a
policy which allows parties to know when the Board will defer and
which best complies with the purposes of the Act.96
In conclusion, it is submitted that, in requiring deferral, the Third
Circuit has attempted to effectuate the national policy in favor of
arbitration without giving due consideration to the other factors involved.0 7 It is suggested that, in doing so, the court has unjustly infringed upon the Board's express duties to decide unfair labor practice
issues. 98 Therefore, the Board should find it necessary to act in order
to protect its jurisdiction, allowing the ultimate determination of the
impact of Pincus to be delayed until the Board formulates a new policy
regarding deferral.
Michael D. Venuti

to correct any injustice which might occur.
20, at 344-45.

Murphy 8e Sterlacci, supra note

See also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,

363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (courts should not review the merits of the arbitrator's decision). This leaves the aggrieved employee with the only alternative
of a suit against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation followed, if successful, by another suit against the employer for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement under § 301 of the Act. See Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 106
L.R.R.M. 2420 (3d Cir., Jan. 21, 1981); R. GORMAN, supra note 13, at 695-98.
The injustice which is most likely to occur is in a case where there are
different issues involved and the union's interests do not coincide with the
individual employee's interests. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B.
No. 2, 103 L.R.R.M. 1113, 1114 (1980), quoting Schatzski, supra note 27, at
909. Where one of the issues has not been fully litigated or considered, the
individual employee will be deprived of his individual rights. Id.
For a further discussion of employees' problems in arbitration, see note
29 supra.
95. An alternate policy would be necessary to remove any doubt as to

the Board's actual position regarding deferral.

See notes 21-29 and accom-

panying text supra.
96. See notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
97. See notes 78-91 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 13-20 and accompanying text supra.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION - 42 U.S.C. § 1983
VALID CLAIM OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
UNDER SECTION

1983,

Is

-

WHERE A

FOUND TO EXIST

BACKPAY IS A PRESUMPTIVELY

APPROPRIATE REMEDY.

Gurmankin v. Costanzo (1980)

In 1969, Judith Gurmankin, a blind woman who holds a professional certification from the Pennsylvania Department of Education as
a teacher of comprehensive English, first attempted to obtain employment in the Philadelphia School District.1 She was unsuccessful because
the district's medical and personnel policy excluded blind teachers from
teaching sighted students in the public schools. 2 Ms. Gurmankin was
classified as having a "chronic or acute physical defect," 3 and was therefore prevented from taking the Philadelphia teacher's examination until
the spring of 1974. 4 Ms. Gurmankin passed the examination, 5 but rejected the positions offered to her by the school district because they
6
did not include retroactive seniority to which she claimed to be entitled.
1. Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115, 1118 (3d Cir. 1980).
2. Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982, 985 (E.D. Pa. 1976), a/I'd,
556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
3. 411 F. Supp. at 985.
4. Id. The School District allowed the plaintiff to take the exam in the

spring of 1974, when, after passage of federal and state legislation, discrimination against the handicapped was deemed to be unlawful. Id. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976); Act of December 19, 1974, P.L.
966, No. 318, § 1 (amending the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, §§ 952-955 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1975)).
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Act) requires federal contractors and programs receiving federal financial assistance to take affirmative action to hire
and promote qualified handicapped individuals. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794
(1976). For a discussion of the affirmative action requirements of the Act, see
Note, Lowering the Barriers to Employment of the Handicapped: Affirmative
Action Obligations Imposed on Federal Contractors, 81 DICK. L. REV. 174
(1976).
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act was amended in 1974 to prohibit discrimination by reason of handicap or disability. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 952 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1975). For further discussion of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, see note 26 infra.
5. 411 F. Supp. at 985. The plaintiff received a score of 82 on the written
examination, ranking her 56th out of 164 exams taken, and a score of 72 on
the oral exam, slightly higher than the minimum passing score of 70. Id.
The court found that the plaintiff had not been evaluated fairly because
the grading of the oral exam had been based, in part, on "misconceptions and
stereotypes about the blind" and their teaching ability. Id. at 987-88. Also,
there was evidence, established by testimony of the Director of Personnel for
the school district that, although the plaintiff was permitted to take the test,
at the time of trial on May 5, 1975, current policy included "a restriction on
the blind teaching the sighted." Id. at 986.
6. Id. at 988. The plaintiff was not qualified for one of the offered posi.
tions, that of a music teacher. Id. Another position was at a disciplinary

(846)
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Ms. Gurmankin filed suit in the district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in November 1974, 7 pursuant to section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (section 1983),8 alleging that the school
district's policy of preventing blind teachers from teaching sighted
students was unconstitutional. 9 In its March 31, 1976 opinion, the
district court ordered that she be offered employment with seniority
retroactive to September 1970.10 More than ten months later, in a
supplemental proceeding, the district court found that the school district
had failed to comply with the original order."' A supplemental order
was entered February 8, 1977 requiring the school district to provide
the appellant with a position at one of six designated schools. 12 Both
orders were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.' 3
boys school which the district and her guidance counselor advised her not to
take. Id.
7. 626 F.2d at 1118.
8. 626 F.2d at 1118. See; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State or Territory subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id. For further discussion of § 1983, see notes 40-57 and accompanying text
infra. For a general discussion of § 1983 and its use in employment discrimination litigation, see Brooks, Use of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871
to Redress Employment Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 258 (1976);
LeGette, 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Claims Against the State for Damages, 7 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 526 (1979).

9. 411 F. Supp. at 983. The court held that refusing to consider blind
applicants for teaching positions solely on the basis of their physical handicap
constituted an irrebutable presumption of physical incompetency which violated the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Id. at 988.
For criticism of the application of the irrebutable presumption doctrine to
Gurmankin, see Note, Applying the Constitutional Doctrine of Irrebutable
Presumption to the Handicapped - Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 27 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1199 (1978); Note, Constitutional Law - Irrebutable Presumption Doctrine - Right of Blind Teacher to Take Teacher's Examination, 23 WAYNE
L. REV. 1295 (1977).

For an analysis of the irrebutable presumption doctrine, see generally

Simson, The Conclusive Presumption Cases: The Search for a Newer Equal
Protection Continues, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 217 (1975); Comment, Irrebutable
Presumptions An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449 (1975); Note, The
Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH.
L. REV. 800 (1974).

10. 411 F. Supp. at 993. The court reserved decision on the plaintiff's
requests for backpay and attorney's fees. Id. at 989. For a discussion of the
district court's reasoning, see notes 58-60 and accompanying text infra.
11. 626 F.2d at 1118. Ms. Gurmankin still had not received an offer of
employment at an "attractive" high school in compliance with the injunction's
seniority provision. Id.
12. Id.

13. Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
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In another supplemental order, the district court denied the plaintiff backpay and tenure from 1970 to the date of its original decision,
March 31,1976, granting only frontpay from that time. 14 Ms. Gurmankin
appealed this decision as an abuse of discretion. 15 The Third Circuit 16
affirmed the district court's denial of tenure, 17 but vacated that portion
of the order which denied the request for backpay for the period prior
to March 31, 1976, holding that plaintiffs in employment discrimination
suits, brought under section 1983, are presumptively entitled to an
award of backpay to make them whole. Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626
F.2d 1115 (3d Cir. 1980).
Individuals with physical or mental handicaps are very often denied
equal opportunities, particularly in employment.' 8 As one court stated
in reference to a blind job applicant,
[t]he blind person in our society seems
double handicap. The first handicap does not appear, however, to present as
second - society's lack of vision as to

to be burdened with a
loss of physical sight great an obstacle as the
the capacity of a blind

14. Gurmankin v. Marcase, No. 74-2980 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 1980). The lower
court also denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification, but granted her
motions requesting seniority, credit for sick and personal days, contributions
by school district to the pension fund to be back dated September, 1970, and
all other benefits accruing to a fulltime, regularly employed secondary school
English teacher with the School District of Philadelphia to accrue as of September 1, 1980. Id.
15. 626 F.2d at 1118. Ms. Gurmankin asserted that she was entitled to
backpay for the entire period during which her constitutional rights were
violated. Id.
16. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz, and Judges Garth and
Sloviter.

judge Sloviter wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Judge

Seitz joined. Judge Garth filed a separate opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
17. 626 F.2d at 1126. The appellant claimed that the court had erred as
a matter of law in holding that it was without power to award tenure and
had abused its discretion in the denial of this relief. Id. at 1125. The appellant relied on Kunda v. Muhlenburg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980), a
Title VII case, in which the Third Circuit had held that tenure could be
awarded under appropriate circumstances, and affirmed the district court's
tenure award. Id. at 1121, citing Kunda v. Muhlenburg College, 621 F.2d
532 (3d Cir. 1980). However, in Kunda, the teacher's achievements and
qualifications were not in dispute and the court, therefore, held that it was
not interfering with academic determinations in awarding Kunda tenure. 621
F.2d at 549. The appellant in the instant case, however, requested that the
trial court grant tenure without having given the school district an opportunity to evaluate her qualifications and performance as a teacher. 626 F.2d
at 1125. The Gurmankin court determined that this would be putting the
appellant in a better position than she would have been absent the constitutional violation and therefore affirmed the district court's denial of tenure. Id.
at 1125-26.
18. Recent "official" statistics on unemployment among the handicapped
will not be available until the 1980 census compilation is completed. "Unofficial" reports indicate there is a high rate of unemployment among the
handicapped. See, e.g., Lublin, Lowering Barriers, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1976,
at 1, col. 1.
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individual to enjoy a full and meaningful life despite the loss
of physical sight.19
The handicapped are not protected against employment discrimination
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which limits its coverage
20
to discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion and national origin.
In response to the needs of the handicapped, Congress has enacted
several types of protective legislation - for example, the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 21 and the Civil Service Act 22 - both of which provide for
the establishment of affirmative action programs to hire and advance
handicapped individuals.23 The Fair Labor Standards Act24 - encourages employers to pay handicapped workers at a rate lower than
other workers in order to prevent curtailment of employment opportunities. 25 Many states have also passed laws which prohibit employment discrimination against the handicapped although the statutes vary
in scope among the states. 26

However, none of these statutes provides

the broadbased protection against employment discrimination against
27
the handicapped that Title VII provides for other minorities.
19. Hoffman v. Ohio Yough Comm'n, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 30, 35
(N.D. Ohio 1975).
20. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976) (originally enacted
as Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 255). For a discussion of the possibility of
extending Title VII to the handicapped, see Note, Equal Employment and the
Disabled, 10 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 457 (1974). For further discussion of
the protections afforded by Title VII, see note 27 infra.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1976).
22. Id. § 791 (1976).
23. Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, government contractors and
agencies must maintain affirmative action programs to hire and promote qualified handicapped individuals. Id. § 793.
The Civil Service Act requires federal departments, agencies and instrumentalities to establish affirmative action programs for hiring, placement, and
advancement of handicapped individuals. Id. § 791.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1) (1976). Although this Act encourages employers
to pay handicapped workers at a rate lower than other employees, the employer
must be prepared to justify the lower rate on the basis of lower productivity.
Id. The statute is designated to stimulate the employment of handicapped
persons whose handicap affects their productivity so that their employment
would not be otherwise justifiable. 4 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION,
§ 107.20 (1978).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1) (1976).
26. See 4 A. LARSON, supra note 24, §§ 108.00-.30 (1978). An example of a
state statute prohibiting discrimination is the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act which prohibits discrimination against the handicapped. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 2 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1975). This statute deems it unlawful to deny
equal employment to handicapped individuals, unless based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification. Id. The employer must determine whether the
handicap substantially interferes with the ability to perform the essential function of the employment and to do so he must inquire beyond the mere existence
of the handicap. Id.
27. 4 A. LAR ON, supra note 24, § 104.20 (1978). In 1964, Congress passed a
Comprehensive Civil Rights Act (Act) of which Title VII is a part. See 42
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Backpay awards in Title VII cases have a sound statutory basis as
backpay is expressly included in the remedial section of the act as an
equitable remedy. 28 In wrongful discharge cases, backpay is also justified on the theory of compensatory contract recovery. 29 Therefore, the
determination of legal damages, including backpay, is a breach of contract determination, and no exercise of judicial discretion need come
30
into play in fashioning a remedy.
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc.,31 a
Title VII case, characterized a backpay award in employment discrimination cases as having a dual role, i.e., a compensatory role in providing tangible monetary relief for the economic loss, and an equitable
role in acting as a deterrent to other employers. 32 The major function
of the Title VII backpay award is to help effectuate the express congressional purpose of Title VII, which is to make the victims of unlawful
discrimination whole. 33
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976), The entities subject to the Act are employers,
employment agencies, and labor organizations. Id. § 2000e-2. All individuals
are protected from certain types of discrimination: Employers cannot refuse to
hire and cannot discharge or otherwise discriminate because of an individual's
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Id. § 2000e-2. It is unlawful for
an employer to utilize these criteria to segregate or classify employees or applicants in a way that tends to deprive them of employment opportunities. Id.
§2000e-2(a)(2). The remedial power of the courts is set forth in §2000e-5:
"The court may enjoin the respondent . . . and order such affirmative action

as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to reinstatement

or hiring of employees, with or without backpay . . . or any other equitable

relief as the court deems appropriate". Id. § 2000e-5(g).
For a general description of laws affecting the handicapped see 4 A. LARSON,
supra note 24, §§ 107.00-108.20 (Cum.Supp. 1979); Lang, Employment Rights of
the Handicapped, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 701 (1977). See generally Burgdorff
& Burgdorff, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15
SANTA CLARA LAW. 855 (1975); Sorkin, Equal Access to Equal Justice: A Civil
Right for the Physically Handicapped, 78 CASE & COM. 41 (Mar.-Apr. 1973).

For an analysis of the position of the handicapped in the job market as

anologized to racial minorities, see Kriegel, Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim: Some
Reflections on the Cripple as Negro, 38 AM. SCHOLAR 412 (1969).

28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964) (amended 1972). For a discussion of Title
VII, see note 27 and accompanying text supra.
29. See Leathers v. Martin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 65 F.R.D. 68, 70 (E.D.N.C.
1974). For a discussion of Leathers, see note 87 and accompanying text infra.
30. Id.

31. 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973).
32. 479 F.2d at 379, citing Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 804
(4th Cir. 1971). The court noted that the equitable purpose of deterrence was
the most important purpose. Id.
33. 118 CONG. REG. 7168 (1972). The purpose of the backpay award is:
to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and . . . the

attainment of this objective rests not only upon the elimination of the
particular unlawful employment practice complained of, but also requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the
unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a posi-
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In Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,34 the United States Supreme
Court established a presumptive right to backpay as a remedy for
discrimination in violation of Title VII. s3 Albermarle was a class action
involving the class of present and former black employees at a North
Carolina paper mill.3 6 The class challenged as discriminatory the
plant's seniority system and employment testing program and requested
a backpay award.37 The Court stated that when a wrong has been
done "the compensation shall be equal to the injury," 88 and established
a presumption in favor of backpay awards to accomplish this goal.3 9
Although section 1983 reaches employment discrimination at the
state and municipal levels, 40 relatively little attention has been given
tion where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.
Id.

34. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
35. Id. at 419.
36. Id. at 408.

37. Id. at 409.
38. Id. at 418-19, quoting Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99
(1867). Backpay is awarded to deter would-be discriminators as well as to provide meaningful relief to the victims of illegal discrimination. 422 U.S. at 418.
39. 422 U.S. at 419. The Albermarle Court also noted that it is the historic
purpose of equity to secure complete justice. Id., citing Brown v. Swann, 35
U.S. (10 Pet.) 497, 503 (1836). The court further stated that where a legal injury
is economic in nature, the injured party must be placed, as near as possible, in
the position he would have been had it not been for the wrong committed.
422 U.S. at 418-19, citing Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867).
The court examined the purpose of Title VII, i.e., to make persons whole
for injuries suffered as a result of unlawful employment discrimination and to
eradicate discrimination throughout the economy. 422 U.S. at 417-18. The
court held that backpay should be denied only for sufficient reasons which
would not frustrate these purposes, but did not specify what would constitute a
sufficient reason. Id. at 421.
40. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1975) (§ 1983 is of limited
scope and applicable only to state action). See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
181-85 (1961) (holding that a cause of action to recover damages from police
officers could be maintained under § 1983).
The jurisdictional basis for § 1983 is provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1976). Section 1343(3) states in pertinent part:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any persons:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act
of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of any persons

within the jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.

Section 1983 was originally enacted as § I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22 § 1, 17 Stat.
13. By its terms § 1983 reaches only persons acting under color of state law.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The statute does not reach purely private conduct.
Id. This statute was passed after the Civil War to give force and effect to the
newly ratified fourteenth amendment which provides that "[n]o State shall make
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to the use of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as a proscription against
employment discrimination. 41 Consequently, backpay awards in section
1983 employment discrimination cases is a fairly new concept. 42 Backpay, however, has been awarded in other types of section 1983 claims,
particularly maternity leave cases in which public school teachers have
been awarded backpay from school districts. 43 Courts have also awarded
backpay to other public employees for violations of their constitutional
rights,44 but none of these cases spoke in terms of a presumption in
45

favor of backpay.
Prior to the instant case, other circuits had discussed the issue of
backpay awards in a section 1983 action. 46 In Harkless v. Sweeney
Independent School District4 7 the Fifth Circuit found backpay to be
an integral aspect of equitable relief to be awarded under section 1983
in a wrongful discharge action against a school district. 48 Harkless was
an action brought by black school teachers against a school district and
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
For a discussion of the history of § 1983, see B. SCHLE1 AND P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (1976).

41. See Brooks, supra note 8, at 259. Litigation under § 1983 can be an
extremely useful method of combating employment discrimination as the action
is not limited in several significant areas as a Title VII action would be. Id.
at 260.
A Title VII action must be filed within 180 days after the discriminatory
event, or within 30 days if the plaintiff is a federal employee. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-5(c), 2000e-5(f)(l), 2000e-16(c) (1976). However, a cause of action under
§ 1983 runs as long as the applicable state statute of limitations. Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975).
Also, punitive damages may be recovered under § 1983. Mansill v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1967). For an in depth analysis of the use
of the Civil Rights Acts in employment discrimination actions, see Brooks,
supra. For a discussion of backpay awards under § 1983 employment discrimination claims, see notes 47-57 and accompanying text infra.
42. See Brooks, supra note 8, at 259.
43. See, e.g., Paxman v. Wilkerson, 390 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Va. 1975) (unrebuttable presumption of unfitness violates due process and the teachers are
entitled to backpay relief); Health v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp.
501 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (pregnant teachers must be provided with a case-by-case
determination of inability to work, awarding full reinstatement including
backpay).
44. See e.g., Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975) (discharge of school teacher was denial of due process which supported an award
of backpay); Ramsey v. Hopkins, 447 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1971) (public employee whose employment was terminated in violation of his constitutional
rights was entitled to back wages); Vega v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 385 F. Supp.
1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (summary dismissal of public employee is 14th amendment violation and plaintiff is entitled to retroactive backpay).
45. See notes 43 & 44 supra.
46. See notes 47-57 and accompanying text infra.
47. 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970).
48. Id. at 323-24.
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the trustees and superintendent of the district for alleged violations of
the teachers' civil rights by not renewing their teaching contracts when
the schools were desegregated. 49 The district court had ordered a jury
trial to adjudicate the merits of the plaintiff's request for a backpay
award.5 0 The appellate court held that backpay was an integral part
of an equitable action for reinstatement authorized by section 1983 and
was, therefore, not for jury consideration. 51
The Tenth Circuit, in Bertot v. School District No. 1,52 also awarded
backpay in a section 1983 case, stating that "under 1983, as under
Title VII, there is 'nothing' on the face of the statute or in its legislative history that justifies the creation of drastic and categorical distinctions between these two remedies." 53 Bertot involved a claim by a
public school teacher against a school district and district officials,
alleging that the district had unlawfully refused to renew her teaching
contract because she had exercised her first amendment right by publicly
taking a position contrary to the policy of the school district regarding
the school dress code. 54 The defendants argued that because they had
acted in good faith and without malice, they were immune from a
section 1983 backpay claim.55 The court held that an award of backpay
is an element of equitable relief, and equitable relief is not precluded
by a good faith defense. 56 The Bertot court felt that a manifest injustice
would result if the plaintiff were not fully compensated for the unconstitutional nonrenewal of her contract and that a backpay award
57
was necessary to avoid this injustice.

49. Id. at 319. The district court, after a full jury trial, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because the municipal

defendant could not be sued under § 1983 as municipalities were not "persons"

within the meaning of § 1983.

Id. at 320-33.

The appellate court reversed

and remanded, holding that the school district was included within the mean-

ing of the word "person" in § 1983 for the purpose of the equitable relief
sought. Id. at 323.
50. Id. at 320.

51. Id. at 324. The court noted that the purpose of the equitable remedy

of injunctive reinstatement was to return the plaintiffs to the position held

before the alleged unconstitutional failure to renew their contracts. Id.
52. 613 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1979).

53. Id. at 250, quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 423.

54. Bertot v. School District No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 1975)
(prior opinion).
55. Id.

56. 613 F.2d at 250. The court stated that there is nothing on the face
of § 1983 that justifies the creation of drastic distinctions between injunctive
and backpay relief. Id., citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at
423.

57. 613 F.2d at 252. The court noted that § 1983 has, as its core, a "concern for fundamental fairness between a powerful government and the indi.
vidual." Id.
The Supreme Court has established that constitutional violations must be
remedied. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

See also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).

In Bell, the Court stated: "[W]here federally protected rights have been in-
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Against this background, the Third Circuit began its discussion of
Gurmankin by stating that meaningful appellate review of the district
court's exercise of discretion required consideration of the basis on
which the trial court had acted.58 A review was then made of the
analysis used by the district court in denying the backpay award. 59
Central to the district court's decision was its belief that the policy
considerations underlying Title VII were very different from the policy
considerations in the instant case.60 Rejecting this conclusion, 61 the
Third Circuit noted that, while it was not necessary to assume parity
of remedy between all Title VII and section 1983 cases, 62 this case, one
of "discrimination in employment based on stereotypical notions of
ability in violation of the constitutional imperative to be judged on an
individual basis . . . requires equitable remedies comparable to those

deemed appropriate in Title VII employment discrimination cases." 63
The Third Circuit also disagreed with the weight given by the district court to the school district's good faith and lack of notice as
factors in its determination not to award backpay. 64 The court cited
Albermarle6 5 and Owen v. City of Independence,68 for the proposivaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief." Id. at 684.
58. 626 F.2d at 1119. The court noted that in reviewing the district
court's exercise of its discretion in denying equitable relief, it must tread a
path between substituting its own judgment and an automatic stamp of approval.
Id. But it noted that the reviewing court has an obligation to require that
the exercise of discretion be in accordance with "what is right and equitable
under the circumstances and the law." Id. at 1120, citing Langness v. Green,
282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931).
59. 626 F.2d at 1120.
60. Id. For a discussion of the policy considerations of Title VII, see
notes 33-38 and accompanying text supra.
61. 626 F.2d at 1120. The court stated that this conclusion was considered
and rejected by it in the first appeal of this case. Id. The court also stated
that there was no distinction in the law of equitable remedies between suits
brought under Title VII and suits brought under § 1983. Id. at 1121, citing
Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 970 (1973).

62. 626 F.2d at 1121.

For a discussion of Title VII and § 1983, see notes

27 & 40 supra.
63. 626 F.2d at 1121.
64. Id. at 1122. The school district contended that the imposition of a
backpay award was not fair as it did not have notice that its conduct was unconstitutional, because the applicable Pennsylvania statute permits each school
district to establish fitness standards for employment. Id. See PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 21-2108 (Purdon 1962).
The Third Circuit characterized the trial court's use of the school district's
good faith as a significant, and possibly the decisive factor, in its determination not to award backpay. Id. The court cited Albermarle as the Supreme
Court's decree that bad faith is not a factor in determining whether backpay
should be awarded for employment discrimination. Id., citing Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). For a discussion of Albermarle, see
notes 34-39 and accompanying text supra.
65. 422 U.S. at 422-23.

66. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).

In Owen, the Supreme Court resolved the dispute

that had arisen regarding the good faith of municipal employees by holding
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tion that backpay is compensation for injury, not a punishment for
moral turpitude and, therefore, bad faith is not a factor to be con67
sidered in deciding whether a backpay award should be ordered.
The final reason given by the trial court for its denial of backpay
was its reliance on the Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Los
Angeles v. Manhart.8

In Manhart, the Supreme Court reversed an

award of retroactive relief for a sex discrimination claim, 69 finding
that the enormous financial impact which retroactive relief would have
caused was an unusual circumstance which rebutted the retroactive
relief presumption. 70 The Third Circuit found reliance on Manhart
unpersuasive in the instant case as the award of backpay to one teacher
would not have a major financial impact on the school district. 71 Nor
did the court find persuasive the argument that backpay should not be
awarded because it would be paid from public funds.7 2 It noted that
the same is true of any award against the school district since it is the
public at large which is ultimately responsible for the district's ad73
ministration.
The court found that the trial court's considerations were insufficient, in light of the underlying policy 74 and precedent of section
1983,75 to deny a backpay award. 76 It noted that the trial court's prior
that the municipality enjoyed no qualified immunity from liability under the
Civil Rights Act based on the good faith of the city officials. Id. at 638.
67. 626 F.2d at 1122. The court implicitly applied the Albermarle-Title
VII reasoning to the case at bar, a § 1983 case. Id. For a discussion of Albermarle, see notes 34-39 and accompanying text supra.
68. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
69. Id. at 720.
70. Id. at 721. In Manhart, female employees of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power had challenged the requirement that female employees make larger contributions to the pension fund than male employees.
Id. at 705. The Supreme Court affirmed the holding that the requirement
violated Title VII, but vacated the award of retroactive relief. Id. at 721.
The Manhart Court stated that "retroactive liability could be devastating

for a pension fund.

The harm would fall in large part on innocent third

parties." Id. at 722-23.
71. 626 F.2d at 1124.
72. Id. The court noted that whenever any public entity incurs liability
the cost is ultimately borne by "innocent" third parties. Id.
73. Id. See generally Le Gette, supra note 8, at 525. In Owen, the
Supreme Court held that a municipality enjoyed no qualified immunity from
liability under the Civil Rights Act and rejected the argument that damages
should not be paid from the public treasury. 445 U.S. at 638, 654. See note
66 supra. The Owen Court found it fairer to have the loss borne by all the
taxpayers than to allow its impact to be felt solely by those whose rights were
violated. Id.
74. For a discussion of the policy of § 1983, see notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
75. For a discussion of the case law concerning backpay awards under
§ 1983, see notes 43-57 and accompanying text supra.
76. 676 F.2d at 1124. The court noted that, as a result of the discriminatory actions of the school district, the appellant was effectively unemployed for
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determination that the appellant was entitled to have been employed as
of September 1970 had little meaning unless she was entitled to back77
pay for that period.
Judge Garth, while concurring in the denial of tenure,7 8 dissented
from the backpay award arguing that the court had assumed Congress'
legislative role.7 9 He asserted that the majority had, for all practical
purposes, held that the presumption of backpay, formerly applied only
to Title VII 80 and age discrimination cases,81 must now be applied
to section 1983 cases as well.8 2 He contended that the Supreme Court
has read into Title VII a presumption of backpay in order to effectuate
a specific congressional purpose, i.e., to eradicate discrimination based
on race, religion, sex, and alienage. 83 However, as Congress has not
enunciated a similar purpose towards the handicapped, the traditional
sound discretion of the district court to award, or not award, retroac84
tive relief should not be burdened by the imposition of a presumption.
Judge Garth also found the cases which the majority cited for
support 85 to be equivocal, as they were primarily wrongful discharge
the entire period for which she sought backpay. Id. The court found no facts
or circumstances, relating to the appellant, cited by the appellee or by the trial
court, which would militate against the exercise of the trial court's discretion in
her favor. Id.
The court also noted that a backpay award has a two-fold purpose, i.e. to
deter would-be discriminators and to provide meaningful relief to the victims of
the discrimination. Id. at 1120. Therefore, the court reasoned that without a
backpay award, the victims of discrimination could not be effectively compensated. Id. at 1121. The restoration of the victim as fully as possible to the economic position in which she would have been absent the discrimination was
recognized by the Court as the proper standard of relief. Id.
77. Id. at 1124.

78. Id. at 1126 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Id. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

80. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Jurinko v.
Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 414
U.S. 970 (1973). For a discussion of Albermarle, see notes 34-39 and accompanying text supra.
81. See Rodriquez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634). Judge Garth stated that
it is appropriate to invoke the presumption of backpay in these cases because
they fall under a statute whose purposes parallel that of Title VII. 626 F.2d
at 1127 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

82. 626 F.2d at 1126 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. Id. at 1127 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge

Garth admitted that discrimination on the basis of disability may be every bit as
onerous as discrimination on the basis of the enumerated Title VII characteristics but asserted that the situations are distinguishable in that Congress did
not include the disabled in the Title VII list of protected classes. Id.
84. Id. Judge Garth concluded that the comprehensive post-Civil War legislation cannot be analogized to the Title VII statutes of the mid-sixties because
in no prior case has the Supreme Court held the presumption of retroactive
relief was applicable to a general § 1983 action. Id.
85. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 47-57 and accompanying text
su ra.
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cases and not failure to hire cases as was Gurmankin.88 He concluded
that backpay in wrongful discharge cases can be justified on a theory
of compensatory contract recovery, a theory which is inapplicable to
this refusal to hire case.87 Judge Garth analyzed the district court's
decision and concluded that it had credited the appellant with every
benefit of every doubt,88 recognizing that backpay would be required
to make the appellant whole.8 9 But, in the proper exercise of its discretion, the district court had found enough unusual circumstances 90
to appropriately limit its award of backpay to that period for which
the school district's bad faith was dispositive of the equitable considerations. 91
The most compelling argument against the Third Circuit's analysis,
it is submitted, is its almost total analogy to Title VII case law.92 In
the absence of a general congressional mandate to prohibit discrimination against the handicapped, it is reasonable to conclude that the Civil
Rights Acts cannot be analogized to Title VII.93 It is suggested, however, that while Title VII and the Civil Rights Acts were passed for
86. 626 F.2d at 1128 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Garth also discussed the fact that this was not a wrongful discharge case
but a failure to hire case. Id. at 1129 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is a distinction which he found significant in light of the
Commonwealth's policy of permitting school districts to establish their own
physical fitness qualifications. Id. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 21-2108 (Purdon
1962).
87. 626 F.2d at 1128 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
citing Leathers v. Martin County Bd. of Educ., 65 F.R.D. 68, 69-70 (E.D.N.C.
1974). In Leathers, the court, in analyzing whether or not the appellant had a
right to a jury trial, found it difficult to characterize backpay as an equitable
remedy as it could be awarded as damages in a court of law. 65 F.R.D. at 70.
88. 626 F.2d at 1129-30 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Garth asserted that the district court drew upon cases which had
applied a presumption when analyzing the plaintiff's case, even though her
claim did not entitle her to such a presumption. Id.
89. 626 F.2d at 1130 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In fact, Judge Garth noted that the district court, in exercising its discretion,
had balanced a presumption in favor of backpay, against the absence of the
other factor that usually serves to justify backpay, a legislative pronouncement
against future violations. Id. Judge Garth also asserted that the district court
had credited the plaintiff with the benefit of all doubts and drew upon cases
which applied a backpay presumption. Id,
90. Judge Garth found the situation in the instant case, where discrimination against a blind teacher was found in an educational setting, by a School
Board, and in the absence of bad faith to be a unique circumstance. Id. at 1130
(Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. Id. at 1131 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For
a discussion of the good faith arguments, see note 64 supra.
92. 626 F.2d at 1126-29 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
93. See id. at 1127. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Garth asserted that the Supreme Court has read into Title VII a presumption of backpay in order to effectuate the congressional decision to tip the
scales against employers who persist in creating the egregious economic problems
to which Title VII was a response. Id. See notes 83-84 and accompanying text
.supra.
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different purposes, both were designed to combat discrimination. 94
Although they cannot and should not be analogized in all areas, it is
submitted that when discrimination violative of either is present, the
remedy must be to afford the most complete relief possible. 95 As the
Supreme Court held in Monell v. Department of Social Services,9 6
"[t]here can be no doubt that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act . . . was intended to provide a remedy to be broadly construed against all forms
of official violation of federally protected rights." 97 Where the injury
is economic, the general rule is that when a wrong is done the compensation should be equal to the injury.98
The presumption of backpay, established by the majority,99 does
not make backpay a mandatory remedy; but unusual circumstances
would be required to deny a backpay award. 100 Although the district
court found that lack of notice and good faith of the school district
to be the requisite unusual circumstances, 101 it is submitted that lack of
notice and good faith should not weigh against a backpay award. Irrespective of the school district's notice and motive, the appellant has
sustained a loss and to deny a backpay award on this basis would deny
her make-whole relief. 10 2 Backpay is not a penalty imposed against
the school district for a bad decision, nor is it a punishment. 1°3 Therefore, it is suggested that motive is logically irrelevant to a determination
of whether backpay is justified.
While the cases cited by the majority are distinguishable from the
instant case in that they are wrongful discharge cases rather than failure
to hire cases,'0 4 it is suggested that this distinction is not a convincing
one. Although in wrongful discharge cases backpay can be justified as
compensatory, 105 it is submitted that a backpay award, even in wrongful
94. For a discussion of the purposes of Title VII and § 1983, see notes 27 &
40 supra.

95. Congress, in the language of § 1983, expressly empowered courts to

entertain a suit in equity to redress the plaintiff for the deprivation of any
rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1972); note 8 supra.

96. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
97. Id. at 700-01.
98. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418, citing Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867).
99. 626 F.2d at 1120.
100. See notes 69-70 and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra. The district court
found unusual circumstances in the good faith of the school district, the absence
of a congressional mandate against handicapped discrimination, and the Pennsylvania statute permitting school districts to establish physical fitness qualifications. See 626 F.2d at 1130.
102. See note 33 supra.
103. See United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d at 379, citing Robinson
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 804 (4th Cir. 1971).
104. For a discussion of this aspect of the opinion, see notes 85-87 and
accompanying text supra.
105. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra.
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discharge cases, cannot be seen as devoid of any equitable function.'06
Backpay serves a major remedial purpose of restoring the plaintiff to
his proper and lawful employment status. 107 It also has another equitable purpose, that of an indirect prospective effect by deterring the same
conduct in the future. 08 Thus, it is submitted that the more reasoned
view is that backpay is, in addition to its compensatory function, an
integral portion of equitable relief. Indeed, in Title VII, Congress expressly included backpay among the equitable remedies available under
the Act. 09
Because it is an equitable remedy, a court will use its discretion
in awarding backpay1x 0 This discretion must be exercised so as to
comport with the historic purpose of equity to secure complete justice."' Equitable remedies in section 1983 should also be awarded so
2
as to satisfy the basic concern of the statute, fundamental fairness,"
and to satisfy the mandate of Bell v. Hood,11s i.e., for courts to adjust
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."14 Therefore, as the plaintiff could not be made whole without backpay, it is submitted that
"fundamental fairness" requires a backpay award, absent unique circumstances. Without make-whole relief, the victims of past constitutionally unlawful discrimination will not be restored to their rightful
economic status. 1 5 The majority's fashioning of a presumption in
favor of backpay, it is suggested, is an appropriate technique to achieve
these goals.
In considering the impact of Gurmankin, it is submitted that a
presumption in favor of backpay is an expansion of the law of section
1983.110 In light of the fact that a presumption of backpay in section
106. For a discussion of the purpose of a Title VII backpay award, see note
33 supra.
107. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
108. United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d at 379. For a discussion of
the deterrent effect of backpay, see note 32 and accompanying text supra. The
Eighth Circuit has stated that backpay awards provide the catalyst which causes
employers to self-evaluate their own practices and endeavor to eliminate discrimination. 479 F.2d at 379. Consistent backpay awards, the court reasoned,
will cause. companies to find it in their best interests to remedy discriminatory
procedures without court intervention. Id.
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964) (amended 1972); note 28 and accompanying text supra.
110. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra.
111. See Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 497, 503 (1836). For a discussion of this point, see note 39 and accompanying text supra.
112. See Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 613 F.2d at 252.
113. 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). For a discussion of Bell, see note 57 supra.
114. Id. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); note 57 supra.
115. See Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94 (1867); notes 38-39 and
accompanying text supra.
116. Bertot is the only other § 1983 case which seems to implicitly establish
.apresumption in favor of backpay. 613 F.2d at 250. For a discussion of Bertot,
see notes 52-57 and accompanying text supra.
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1983 actions, equal in force to a Title VII backpay presumption, is
now operative in the Third Circuit, it is submitted that prospective
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases may conceivably choose
to sue under section 1983, rather than Title VII. 117 This choice may
be made by the plaintiff if, for example, the Title VII statute of limitations has run, or a good case could be made for punitive damages. 1 8
Along these same lines, it may also be preferable for handicapped individuals who are victims of employment discrimination to sue under
section 1983 rather than the applicable state law prohibiting such discrimination, depending on the state law's scope and procedural restrictions.1 9
It is possible that the holding of Gurmankin will be applied to
allow plaintiffs in other types of section 1983 cases to enjoy a presumption in favor of backpay. However, the presumption was justified
by the Third Circuit in light of the particular circumstances of discrimination in employment based on stereotypical notions of ability
20
in violation of one's constitutional right to be judged as an individual.
Therefore, it would seem that the reasoning of this decision is, and
should in the future be, limited to the context of unlawful discrimina21
tion in the employment.'
In conclusion, it is submitted that the majority's position, although
not mandated by precedent, shows a sensitivity to the needs of the
handicapped, as well as an awareness of the need for make-whole relief
in the area of employment discrimination. It would seem that as a
result of this decision, plaintiffs similarly situated will have an almost
automatic grant of backpay absent a showing of serious countervailing
circumstances.

122

Jean Marie Keeler
117. A cause of action under § 1983 runs as long as the applicable state
statute of limitations. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454,
462 (1975). A Title VII action must be filed within 180 days after the discriminatory event, or within 30 days if the plaintiff is a federal employee. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(c), 2000e-5(f)(1), 2000e-16(c) (1976). Also punitive damages
may be awarded under § 1983. Mansill v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573, 576 (5th

Cir. 1967).

For a discussion of Title VII and § 1983 actions, see note 41 and accompanying text supra.
118. See note 117 supra.
119. For a discussion of applicable state laws, see note 26 and accompanying text supra.
120. See 626 F.2d at 1121. See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974) (establishing that irrebutable presumptions of inability to work
violate due process).
121. See notes 58-77 and accompanying text supra.
122. Serious countervailing circumstances would not be made out merely by
a showing of good faith or lack of notice but would require more, for example,
the serious financial impact on pension funds that would have resulted in City
of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). For a discussion of Manhart,
see notes 68-71 and accompanying text supra.
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